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NOTES

PROTECTING SHAREHOLDERS: ILLINOIS
NEEDS A DIRECTOR LIABILITY
STATUTE
INTRODUCTION

On May 4, 1988, the Illinois House of Representatives effectively killed Senate Bill 1214.1 The bill would have permitted Illinois corporations to protect their directors from personal liability
for monetary damages in shareholder suits for negligence.2 Such
protection would have helped Illinois corporations attract highly
qualified persons to serve on their boards of directors. Illinois is
now one of only nine states that does not provide some form of stat3
utory liability protection for corporate directors.
This Note advocates that the Illinois General Assembly pass a
director liability statute as a means of helping attract qualified persons to serve as outside directors on the boards of Illinois corporations. Outside directors 4 play a critically important role 5 in the
1. The Illinois House of Representatives tabled Senate Bill 1214 pursuant
to House Rule 26. LEGIS. SYNOPSIS & DIG., 85th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1988 Sess.,
at 268 (No. 11, Vol. I) (1988) [hereinafter LEGIS. SYNOPSIS & DIG.]; 1 J.H.R. 778
(1988). See irfra notes 137-152 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
legislative history of Senate Bill 1214.
2. See infra notes 139-140 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
directors' liability statute proposed in Senate Bill 1214.
3. See infra notes 116 and 123 for a discussion of directors' liability statutes adopted in other states. The nine states which have not yet enacted director liability statutes are Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia.
4. In the simplest formulation, outside directors are those members of a
corporation's board of directors who are neither officers nor employees of the
corporation. See Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the
Corporation and Protectionfrom Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 30 (1987).
Other definitions of outside directors draw more precise distinctions. See, e.g.,
A.B.A. Sec. Corp., Banking & Bus. L., CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, (Rev. ed.
Jan. 1978), reprinted in 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1619-20 (1978) [hereinafter Guidebook]. The Guidebook distinguishes three categories of directors: 1) management directors, who are involved full-time in the affairs of the corporation; 2)
affiliated non-management directors, who may be former officers or employees
of the corporation, attorneys, commercial bankers, investment bankers, and
others who provide goods or services to the corporation, or directors who have
close family ties to key members or management; 3) unaffiliated non-management directors, who have no relationship with the corporation which would interfere with the exercise of his independent judgment. Id.
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governance of the contemporary publicly-held corporation in
America.6 While all directors are charged with representing the
interests of the shareholders, 7 outside directors have the added responsibility of monitoring the performance of management on behalf of the shareholders.8 Illinois can protect shareholders and
assist management by encouraging Illinois corporations to include
highly qualified outside directors on their boards.
Section I of this Note provides an overview of the evolution of
the American business corporation and the changing relationship
among corporate directors, management, and shareholders. Section
I also explores state and federal courts' traditional application of
the business judgment rule to shield directors from personal liability for business decisions. 9 Section II examines the directors' liability crisis of 1985 to 1990 when unprecedented merger and
acquisition activity; changes in the insurance industry; and a series
of decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court, the nation's most influential interpreter of corporation law,1 0 combined to create a nationwide directors' liability crisis.' Section III examines legislative
5. Both outside and inside directors of the corporation are responsible for
exercising the power of the corporation. Under the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the
direction of, its board of directors .... " REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 8.01 (1991) [hereinafter RMBCA]. See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the special role of the outside director.
6. In this Note, "corporations" refers to large, publicly-held corporations
whose shares are publicly traded. This usage follows the definition of the
American Law Institute, which provides that a large, publicly-held corporation
is one that has 2,000 or more record holders of its equity securities and total
assets of at least $100 million. Am. Law Inst., Principlesof CorporateGovernance: Analysis and Recommendations § 1.16 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984), as cited
in Pease, supra note 4, at 26.
7. See Guidebook, supra note 4, at 1606 (stating that a director's fundamental responsibility is to represent the shareholders, who are the owners of the
corporation).
8. Elliott J. Weiss & Donald E. Schwartz, Using Disclosureto Activate the
Board of Directors, as cited in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND REFORM 109, 121-22 (Deborah A. DeMott ed., 1980) (observing the
consensus developed in recent years that boards of directors should have a majority of outside directors who are completely independent of management and
whose principal function is not to manage the business but to monitor management's performance).
9. See infra notes 25-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
evolution of the American business corporation; the changing relationship
among corporate directors, management, and shareholders; and state and federal courts' use of the business judgment rule to shield directors from personal
liability for their business decisions.
10. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL
7 (2d ed. 1987) (describing the Delaware Legislature and the Delaware Supreme
Court as "the principal sources of modern corporation law today").
11. See ivkfra notes 83-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
unprecedented merger and acquisition activity, reduced availability of director
and officer liability insurance, and Delaware Supreme Court decisions subject-
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responses by the states to the directors' liability crisis, focusing primarily on the Delaware director liability statute passed in 1986.12
Section III also examines factors which may explain the Illinois
General Assembly's rejection of a similar statute in 1988.13 Section
14
IV analyzes In re DataproductsShareholders'Litigation,
the first
case applying the Delaware director liability statute, as a means for
evaluating the provisions of the Delaware statute. 15 Lastly, Section
V concludes that passage of a director liability statute would greatly
16
benefit Illinois corporations and their shareholders.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE CONTROL

Large publicly-held corporations control billions of dollars in
capital. 17 Corporations acquire their capital from shareholders who
exchange their dollars for shares of ownership in the corporation
because they expect to earn a profit on their investment.1 8 Even
though shareholders own the corporation, shareholders do not decide how the corporation will use the capital it acquires. 19 Instead,
managers of the corporation run the business and make the decisions which determine whether the shareholders' hopes of profits
ing directors' business decisions to a heightened scrutiny which combined to
create the 1985-90 directors' liability crisis.
12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986).
13. See infra notes 137-153 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Illinois General Assembly's rejection of a director liability statute.
14. In re Dataproducts Shareholders' Litigation, [1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,227, 91,178 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 1991).
15. See infra notes 160-182 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re
DataproductsShareholders'Litigation,the first case applying the Delaware director liability statute.
16. See infra notes 183-195 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
reasons why Illinois should adopt a director liability statute. A proposed director liability statute which specifically excludes from protection acts which are
grossly negligent or reckless is included in the Appendix to this Note.
17. Shareholders' equity in the following corporations demonstrates the
amount of capital controlled by large, publicly-held corporations: General Motors, $34,982,500,000; Ford Motor Co., $22,727,800,000; Exxon, $30,244,000,000;
International
Business
Machines,
$38,509,000,000;
General
Electric,
$20,890,000,000; and Mobil, $16,274,000,000. Louis RUKEYSER'S BUSINEss ALMANAC 562 (Louis Rukeyser ed., 1991).
18. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 4-5 (1991) (describing the operation of the financial market in which corporations compete for investors' dollars by promising to deliver higher returns).
19. Id. at 2, 4 (discussing the decision-making powers of managers and the
control exercised by managers as compared to the inability of shareholders to
control managers). See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw: An Essayfor Bill Carey, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187, 204 (1983) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw] (describing management's
control of the business of the corporation and shareholders' inability to oversee
management).
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will be realized. 20 This separation of ownership from control is at
21
the heart of the problem of corporate control.
Understanding the problem of corporate control is essential to
a recognition of the importance of outside corporate directors. An
outside director can act as a monitor of corporate decision-making
and as a representative of shareholder interests. 2 2 Thus, shareholder interests will best be served if highly qualified persons agree
to serve as outside directors. Shareholder interests are not served
when qualified persons refuse to serve as outside directors because
they fear they will be held personally liable for monetary damages
for mistakes that were made in good faith. A statutory limitation
on director liability for monetary damages for ordinary negligence
23
is, therefore, in the interests of shareholders.
Part A of this section will trace the evolution of corporate governance and show how the problem of corporate control developed.
Part B will examine three traditional means of control available to
shareholders: directors' fiduciary responsibility to shareholders,
shareholder voting, and shareholder class action suits. Part B will
show why shareholder voting is an ineffective means of controlling
management decisions. Part B will also show that shareholder suits
to enforce the directors' fiduciary duty of care are ineffective due to
the courts' application of the business judgment rule.2 4 Part C will
explain the role of the outside director and show how the outside
director can ameliorate the problem of corporate control by serving
as a representative of shareholder interests.
A.
1.

The Evolution of Corporate Governance

Early History of American Corporations

Immediately after the American Revolution, state legislatures
assumed the English sovereign's power to award corporate char20. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 2; Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw, supra note 19, at 204.
21. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (describing the growth of corporations which led to the separation
of shareholder ownership from control of the corporation and the removal of
checks which once operated to curb corporations' "misuse of wealth and
power").
22. See infra notes 72-76 and 82 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the role of the outside director as a representative of shareholders' interests.
23. A statutory limitation on director liability for monetary damages is in
the interests of shareholders to the extent that it encourages qualified persons
to serve as outside directors. See infra notes 72-76 and 82 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the importance to shareholders of qualified outside
directors.
24. See infra notes 52-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use
of the business judgment rule to shield corporate directors from liability for
their business decisions.
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ters.25 Initially, however, state legislatures awarded charters sparingly, because the legislators feared that corporations might abuse
26
the power that they derived from large accumulations of capital.
Even when legislatures permitted incorporation, legislators imposed restrictions on the purpose of the corporation, the amount of
capital it could acquire, and the persons who could serve as its directors.27 By the end of the nineteenth century, however, states had
adopted a much more permissive stance toward business corporations because the corporate form facilitated commercial development.28
Ultimately, the legislatures' desire for commercial
expansion overwhelmed their desire to keep corporations under
tight restrictions. 29
2. The Rise of New Jersey and Delaware as States of
Incorporation
By the end of the nineteenth century, states such as New
Jersey and Delaware, seeing an opportunity to collect handsome
amounts in incorporation fees and license and franchise taxes, went
even further. 30
They adopted very liberal corporation laws
designed to attract businesses to incorporate in their states, even if
the businesses might operate in other states. 31 Delaware quickly
gained a position of dominance in the race for incorporations and
continues to occupy that position today. 32 Because corporations are
25. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 128 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS].
26. Id. See also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-49 (1933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing fear of abuse of power engendered by corporate form and corporations' aggregation of capital).
27. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, supra note 25, at 128. See also Liggett, 288
U.S. at 550-56 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing state limitations on the
amount of capital authorized for business corporations, limitations on the purposes of corporations, and requirements that directors be residents of the state
of incorporation).
28. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, supra note 25, at 128.
29. Id. See also Liggett, 288 U.S. at 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing
the "irresistible demand for charters" created by desire for business expansion).
30. See Liggett, 288 U.S. at 557-63 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing the
efforts of New Jersey, Delaware, Maine, Arizona, and South Dakota to attract
incorporations by liberalizing their corporate laws).

31. Id.
32. Delaware has been extremely successful in attracting corporations. In
1985, more than half of the Fortune 500 companies and approximately 40% of
the corporations traded on the New York Stock Exchange were incorporated in
Delaware. Stacy D. Blank, Note, DelawareAmendment Relaxes Directors'Liability, 44 WASH. & LEE L. R. 111, 111 (1987). Delaware is the state of incorporation of 256 of the corporations which are included in the Standard & Poor's 500
Composite Stock Index (S&P 500) and corporation tax revenues account for
17% of the state's income. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 136 (1991).
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governed by the law of their state of incorporation, Delaware corporate law and the Delaware courts exert an enormous impact on
33
American corporate law.

3. From the Deep Freeze to the Big Chill
Once state legislatures abandoned their earlier restrictions on
corporations, the statutes which governed publicly-held corporations entered a sort of "ice age" that lasted until the mid-1970s. 34 In
the interim, corporations changed dramatically. 35 In the late nineteenth century, the board of directors of a typical corporation actually managed the business of the corporation. 36 In that time period,
the corporation's small number of shareholders monitored the performance of the directors and held them accountable for their deci33. The importance of the law of the state in which a corporation is incorporated is heightened by the "internal affairs rule" which requires foreign courts
to apply the law of the state of incorporation to issues relating to the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, supra note 25, at
151 n.1. See also RMBCA, supra note 5, § 15.05(c) (discussing internal affairs
rule). For discussions of Delaware corporation law and its national impact, see
generally S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware CorporationLaw, 1 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1 (1976). Arsht was one of the drafters of the 1967 revision of the
Delaware General Corporation Law. In the cited article, he traces the 189-year
history of Delaware General Corporation law with an eye to dispelling notions
of "sinister motives and methods in its development." Id. at 1. See also William
Cary, Federalism and the CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware,83 YALE
L. J. 663 (1974) (describing Delaware corporation law as overly pro-management and arguing that Delaware led other states into a "race to the bottom" in
an effort to attract corporations); Joel Seligman, Comment, Law for Sale: A
Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969)
(describing the dominant role of the Delaware corporate bar in drafting the
revision of the Delaware General Corporation Law); Joel Seligman, A Brief
History of Delaware'sGeneral CorporationLaw of 1889, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249,
282 (1976) [hereinafter Seligman, A Brief History] (describing Delaware General Corporation Law as "the most influential business statute" in the United
States and the "closest thing we have to a national corporate law"). For discussions of Delaware corporate law from a law and economics perspective, see
RONALD WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 9-10 (1978) (rejecting
the notion that Delaware corporate law is too liberal and arguing that if Delaware law hurt profits and performance of Delaware corporations, investors
would reflect that fact in the marketplace); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware'sCorporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982) (rejecting Professor Cary's characterization of Delaware corporation law and arguing that market operates more
effectively than law to regulate corporations).
34. Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw, supra note 19, at 188
(describing state legislatures' failure to change their corporation laws to keep
up with important new developments and problems in business).
35. Id. at 204 (discussing the change in scale of the corporation from small
firms managed by the board of directors and accountable to the shareholders to
huge, publicly-held corporations controlled by full-time managers and officers
accountable to the board of directors).
36. Id. (describing the board-managed firm as the "implicit model" which
served as the basis for traditional corporation statutes).
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sions. 37 By the 1970s, however, full-time executives managed large,
publicly-held corporations and the board of directors monitored the
performance of management. 3
Management was no longer directly accountable to shareholders, who stood on the periphery,
without effective means of assuring that management's decisions
actually maximized shareholder profits. 39 Thus, the problem of
corporate control arose because late 20th century corporations still
operated under corporate governance structures designed for the
19th century corporation. 40 Part B will show that more traditional
means of shareholder control over management, such as the fiduciary relationship between directors and shareholders, shareholder
voting, and shareholder class action suits have proven to be limited
in their effectiveness.
B.
1.

TraditionalMeans of Shareholder Control

FiduciaryDuties of CorporateDirectors

Directors of corporations have a fiduciary relationship to the
corporation's shareholders. 4 1 This fiduciary relationship imposes
37. Id. (describing the model of the firm in which management is directly
accountable to shareholders as correct 100 years ago but observing that this
model "has long since ceased to be the norm").
38. Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw, supra note 19, at 204
(describing the management function as having "dropped down one step in the
corporate pyramid" from the board of directors to the full-time executives and
the oversight function dropping from shareholders to the board).
39. Id. (describing the futility of expecting shareholders in large, publiclyheld corporations to monitor or oversee management of corporation).
40. See id. at 204-05 (arguing that model of director accountability was accurate for late 19th century corporation but seriously inaccurate for much larger,
management-dominated corporations 100 years later).
41. Marcia M. McMurray, An HistoricalPerspectiveon the Duty of Loyalty,
and the Business Judgement Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 606 (1987). A fiduciary
has a duty "to act primarily for another's benefit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
625 (6th ed. 1990). A fiduciary relationship "gives rise to certain legal incidents
and obligations ....
Id. A fiduciary who breaches this responsibility is liable
to the person for whose benefit he is acting for damages caused by the breach.
Id. See also Ronald M. Loeb, Current Legal Environment, in DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 19, 20-21 (Avery S. Cohen & Ronald M.
Loeb eds., 1978) (discussing the evolution of the definition of fiduciary duties of
corporate directors from its origin in laws governing trustees to the "prudent
man" definition in modern corporation statutes).
Under Delaware law, directors owe fiduciary responsibilities to the shareholders because "directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and
affairs of the corporation.... [T]he existence and exercise of this power carries
with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its
shareholders." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). See also Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (stating that directors have an
"unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders"). For a discussion of corporate directors' fiduciary relationship and duties, see Stephen A.
Radin, The Director'sDuty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39
HASTINGS L. J. 707, 710 (1988) (observing that corporate directors owe fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty to both the corporation and its shareholders); Robert
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on directors the duties of care and loyalty when making decisions
regarding the business of the corporation. 42 These duties arise from
E. Bull, Directors'Responsibilitiesand Shareholders'Interests In the Aftermath
of Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 885, 890
(1989) (explaining that fiduciary obligations flow from the fact that directors,
rather than shareholders, manage the affairs of the corporation). But see
RMBCA, supra note 5, § 8.30 (rejecting the notion of a fiduciary relationship
between directors and shareholders). Although § 8.30 requires directors of corporations to perform their duties in "good faith," the RMBCA does not use the
term "fiduciary." RMBCA, supra note 5, § 8.30. The purpose for rejecting the
term "fiduciary" is to avoid confusing the standard of care for directors with the
"unique attributes and obligations of a fiduciary imposed by the law of trusts"
which are deemed inappropriate for directors of corporations. RMBCA, supra
note 5, § 8.30 and Official Comment to § 8.30 at 245. See also Ralph K. Winter,
Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection, and the Theory of the Corporation,in
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 91, 98 (Richard

A. Posner & Kenneth E. Scott eds., 1980) (arguing that the analogy between
trustees and corporate directors is faulty because trustees and corporate directors have "utterly different economic functions and operate under utterly different economic constraints"); Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule
and the Director'sDuty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 14991500 (1984) (rejecting both trustee model of fiduciary duties and torts model of
prudent person in favor of more realistic "duty of attention").
42. Section 8.30(a)(2) of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act defines the director's duty of care as "the care an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would exercise under similar circumstances." RMBCA, supra
note 5, § 8.30(a)(2). Section 8.30(a)(3) requires the director to act "in a manner
he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation." Id. at
§ 8.30(a)(3). Under the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, the duty of
care requires that a director become informed before making a decision or taking an action. See RMBCA, supra note 5, Official Comment to § 8.30 at 245.
Delaware law holds directors to a duty of care which is very similar to the
duty of care under the RMBCA. See E. Norman Veasey, Directorsand Officers,
in THE DELAWARE LAW

OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §

4.7

at 4-169 (R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein eds., Supp. 1991). The Delaware duty of care for corporate directors is set forth in dictum in Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). Id. Under the Grahamstandard of care, directors managing a corporation must use the same amount of
care that an ordinarily prudent person would use in similar circumstances. Id.
In Illinois, in the absence of a statutory standard of care, the courts have
applied a common law standard which is stricter than that of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act: the "degree of care and prudence that men prompted
by self-interest exercise in the management of their own affairs." Romanik v.
Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc., 435 N.E.2d 712, 722 (Ill. App. 1982). See also
Michael L. English, Current Trends In Directors'Liability,ISBA CORP. & SEC.,
Sept. 1986 at 1 (describing Illinois courts' application of "prudent man" common
law standard to measure directors' conduct, in absence of statutory definition of
standard of care).
The duty of care may be characterized as a duty to refrain from negligence.
MORTIMER FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREC-

TORS 28 (2d ed. 1974). By contrast, the duty of loyalty is the duty to avoid conflicts of interest or self-dealing. Id. The duty of loyalty requires the director to
be disinterested. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984). A director is
not disinterested in a transaction if he enjoys or expects to enjoy a "personal
financial benefit" which will not be extended to all the stockholders. Id.
Although the duties of care and loyalty have traditionally been regarded as
separate and distinct, some law and economics theorists reject the conventional
distinction between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. See EASTERBROOK
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the nature of the corporation as an institution in which management and ownership are separated. The board of directors is ultimately responsible for managing the corporation on behalf of the
shareholders who are the corporation's owners.43 Because courts
recognize a fiduciary relationship between the directors and the
shareholders, shareholders have enforceable rights against the
44

directors.

In theory, shareholders control the management of the corporation because they elect the board of directors and they vote on
fundamental questions of corporate policy. 45 In practice, however,

shareholders' control over the corporation is illusory. 46 Moreover,
& FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 103 (arguing that violations of either duty should
be viewed simply as "agency costs . .. that reduce shareholders' wealth").
43. Traditionally, the corporation has been regarded as a three-tiered structure consisting of: 1) shareholders who are the ultimate owners of the enterprise, 2) the board of directors who are responsible for managing the
corporation, and 3) the officers who are charged with acting for the corporation
to implement the decisions of the board of directors. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, supra note 25, at 3. In their classic 1932 work on the nature of the American business corporation, Berle and Means identified three trends which
fundamentally changed the character of the economy: concentration of economic power, dispersion of stock ownership, and separation of ownership and
control. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

xxix (1968 rev. ed.). They observed in the

introduction to their 1968 revised edition that these trends had continued so
that, 35 years later, economic power had "built up in the hands of corporate
management" and "the separation of ownership and control has released management from the over-riding requirement that it serve stockholders." Id.
xxxv.
44. The fact that "directors, rather than shareholders, manage the ... corporation" creates the fiduciary relationship between directors and shareholders.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
45. Shareholder approval is required for fundamental changes in the structure of the corporation such as merger, sale of substantially all of the corporation's assets, amendment of the corporation's certificate of incorporation, and

dissolution of the corporation.

A.

EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE

CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 3 (1976)
TURE OF THE CORPORATION]. Shareholders

[hereinafter EISENBERG, THE STRUCalso elect the members of the board

MELVIN

of directors. Id. at 2.
46. One commentator has termed shareholder democracy a myth, declaring
the mechanism of shareholder voting to be meaningless as a device for controlling the management of the corporation. See Bayless Manning, Book Review,
67 YALE L. J. 1477, 1489 (1958) (reviewing J. A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN
STOCKHOLDER (1958)). The conventional explanation for the meaninglessness
of shareholder voting is that "shareholdings are atomistically dispersed" so that
no single shareholder owns enough stock to make a difference in the outcome.
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 45, at 64. However, Eisenberg suggests that this model is empirically unfounded, especially in
corporations with 1,000 or more shareholders. Id. He finds that in at least half
of the corporations which have between 1,000 and 2,999 shareholders, "the ten
largest record shareholders" own 30-40% of the stock. Id. He also finds that in
corporations with 3,000 or more shareholders, "only a small fraction of the
stock is owned by unsophisticated investors with small investments." Id.
Rather, at least half the stock in these corporations is held by sophisticated institutional investors who have both the ability and the incentive to cast their
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the board of directors' virtually exclusive access to the corporate
votes seriously. Id. Eisenberg's data on institutional investors were compiled in
the mid-1970's. Since that time, institutional investors have grown to a position
of even greater dominance. See Ira M. Millstein, The Responsibility of the Institutional Investor in CorporateManagement, in THE BATTLE FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL: SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS, STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS, AND MANAGERIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 67, 70 (Alfred W. Sametz ed., 1991). A study conducted by the

Institutional Investor Project shows that the assets of pension funds grew at a
rate of 14.6% per year from 1981-87, increasing from $891 billion to over $2 trillion by 1987. Id. In 1987, pension funds accounted for 43.5% of all institutional
investors. Id. Altogether, institutional investors controlled approximately 49%
of the shares in the top 50 American corporations. Id. The Institutional Investor Project estimates that pension funds will hold over two-thirds of the shares
of large, publicly-traded corporations by the year 2000. Id. Despite the concentration of ownership in the hands of pension funds, however, Millstein contends
that pension funds have abdicated "their ownership responsibilities by not participating in the corporate governance process," by failing to vote their proxies,
or by always voting with management, or, on some issues, by always voting
against management. Id.
It appears that the explanation for this failure is traceable to the legal
structure of the corporation, the rules that specify which issues management
must submit to a vote of the shareholders, and the rules that permit shareholders to vote only to accept or reject proposals formulated and approved by the
board of directors. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, SuPra
note 45, at 3. As Eisenberg points out, shareholder approval is not required for
a number of actions which he terms "modern fundamental changes - business
combinations other than mergers, corporate contractions, and corporate divisions." Id. Moreover, most states require board approval of the traditional fundamental changes (mergers, corporation contractions, and corporate divisions)
before management can submit the question to the shareholders for a vote. Id.
at 4. Even when such questions are submitted to the shareholders, shareholders' power is limited to approving or disapproving the package formulated by
the board; the shareholders cannot alter the package. Id. at 4. Similarly, shareholders vote to elect directors but in most states, shareholders cannot remove
directors except for good cause. Id. at 2.
Recent events suggest, however, that institutional investors can exert significant pressure on corporate managers by withholding their votes for the
slated directors, by introducing or supporting shareholder proposals, and by
winning changes in the rules which govern control of the proxy machinery.
See, e.g., Bret D. Fromson, SEC Offers ShareholdersMore Say Over Directors,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 6, 1992, § 1 at 11 (discussing Securities and Exchange

Commission ruling that permitted Exxon shareholders to vote on a shareholder
proposal to create a watchdog panel to oversee Exxon's board of directors); Kevin G. Salwen & Joann S. Lublin, Giant Investors Flex Their Muscles More at
US. Corporations,WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1992, § A at 1 (Midwest ed.) (discussing
institutional investors' new activism, the impact of institutional investors on
corporations such as ITT Corp., UAL Corp., and International Paper Co., and
the likelihood that the Securities and Exchange Commission will enhance investors' ability to affect management decisions by easing rules which currently
inhibit communication among shareholders); John Schmeltzer, Mutual Fund's
Vote Will Buck Sears Board, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 1992, § 2 at 1 (describing Fidelity Investments' plan to vote its eight million shares of Sears stock in support of
shareholder proposals to make shareholder votes confidential and to end staggered terms for directors as a response to Sears' poor performance and the declining value of Sears shares); John Schmeltzer, Stockholders Take Aim at
Performanceby Sears, CH. TRIB., May 14, 1992, § 3 at 1 (describing the decisions
of two of the nation's largest pension funds to express their dissatisfaction with
Sears' performance: California Public Employees Retirement System (Calpers),
holding 1.97 million shares of Sears stock, voted against the re-election of three
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proxy machinery effectively prevents shareholders from raising issues, forming coalitions, or otherwise organizing any meaningful
47
opposition to the policies pursued by the directors.
Although shareholder voting appears to be ineffective as a
means of controlling the board, shareholder class action suits allow
a group of shareholders to sue the directors. Shareholders who are
directly injured by an action taken by the corporation can bring a
claim against the directors for equitable relief or monetary damages. 48 Alternatively, shareholders who are only indirectly injured
can bring a derivative action in which they sue the directors on bedirectors; TIAA-CREF, holding millions of shares of Sears stock, abstained
from voting for the three directors); John Schmeltzer & Charles Storch, Sears'
ShareholdersFire "Warning Shot" at Execs, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1992, § 1 at 1
(discussing the outcome of voting on shareholder proposals and re-election of
directors to the board of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and observing that although
none of the protest votes garnered the support of a majority of shareholders,
the surprising strength of the shareholder revolt should serve as a warning to
Sears' management); Pat Widder, New Role for Big-time Money Managers:Rebel, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1992, § 1 at 1 (discussing growing importance of institutional investors and their increasing willingness to use "their clout to insist on
change" in corporations such as Sears); A Wobbly California Giant, ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 75 (describing Calpers' position as "America's largest pension fund" and its willingness to use its position as a major shareholder to press
for changes in twelve targeted corporations).
47. Since voting by proxy is the dominant mode of shareholder decisionmaking, board control of corporate proxy machinery helps insure that directors
control the outcome of the vote. EISENBERG, THE STRUcTURE OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 45, at 97. State laws and SEC Proxy Rules give the board
preferential access to the corporate proxy machinery. Id. at 111. For example,
SEC Proxy Rule 14-a-7 requires the corporation to provide a shareholder list to
a shareholder who wants to communicate with the corporation's shareholders.
Id. at 111 n.55. Although this rule appears to facilitate communication among
shareholders, it has drawbacks which limit its effectiveness. Id. A major limitation is the requirement that a shareholder who takes advantage of the provision must pay the cost of the communication. Id. The board of directors, by
contrast, can communicate with shareholders using the funds of the corporation. Id. at 112. SEC Proxy Rule 14-a-8 imposes an even more severe restriction
by excepting elections to office from the coverage of Rule 14-a-7. Id. at 111.
However, on October 15, 1992, the SEC adopted regulations which facilitate
communication among shareholders and permit shareholders to cast their votes
for individual candidates for the board of directors, rather than limiting shareholders to voting for or against a proposed slate of directors. Stephen Labaton,
S.E.C. Votes Rules on Pay,As Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at C1, C6. The
new regulations also require corporations to make more complete disclosures
regarding executive compensation. Id. at C1. The new regulations could make
it easier for shareholders to challenge directors and could lead to the election of
a greater number of outside directors. Id.
48. See HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, supra note 25, at 1088 (distinguishing
between direct claims "based on a direct injury to the shareholder as such" and
derivative claims "based on an injury to the corporation" which only indirectly
constitutes an injury to the shareholder). Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure governs shareholder class action suits presenting direct claims. See
FED. R. CIv. P. 23. The statute governing Illinois class action claims is ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-801 to 2-806 (1991).
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half of the corporation. 49 However, seeking post facto redress for
injury through a class action suit is an imperfect and inefficient
means for shareholders to maximize their interests as owners of the
corporation.5 0 Litigation is expensive, time-consuming and diverts
management from its principal task of maximizing shareholder
profits.

51

2. The Business Judgment Rule
Another reason that shareholder suits are an ineffective means
of controlling corporate directors' decisions is that American courts
have traditionally been reluctant to second-guess the decisions of
corporate directors. 52 Instead, courts apply the common law business judgment rule.53 Under the business judgment rule, the court

49. Shareholder derivative actions are governed by Rule 23.1. FED. R. CIv.
P. 23.1. Rule 23.1 imposes requirements on shareholder-plaintiffs bringing derivative claims that Rule 23 does not impose on shareholders who bring direct
claims. For example, a derivative claim must allege with particularity the

plaintiffs' efforts to seek the desired action from the corporation's board of directors before bringing suit. Id. The additional requirements of Rule 23.1 may
stem from a desire to prevent shareholders from bringing "strike suits," defined

as suits brought "solely for their settlement value."

HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS,

supra note 25, at 1085. A New Jersey Federal judge recently initiated disciplinary proceedings against an attorney who allegedly took advantage of class-action procedures to earn millions of dollars from the operation of a "virtual
shareholder litigation factory." Jonathan M. Moses, Lawyer Give to Filing
ShareholderLawsuits Comes Under Scrutiny, Wall St. J., Cot. 28, 1992, § A at 1
(Midwest ed.).
50. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 98-99 (describing courts'
inability to rectify "shortcomings in the boardroom" and concluding that while
the threat of civil liability may deter "large, one-shot frauds," it is ineffective as
a deterrent to negligent conduct); Richard W. Duesenberg, The Business Judgment Rule and ShareholderDerivativeSuits: A View from the Inside, 60 WASH.
U. L.Q. 311, 331-33 (1982) (contending that cultural and professional values,
rather than the threat of shareholder suits, motivate directors to perform effectively and maximize shareholder interests).
51. Duesenberg, supra note 50, at 332 (describing expense of litigation, injury to organizational morale, and diversion of management's "time and talent"
as the negative impact shareholder suits have on profitable operation of the
corporation and, ultimately, on the value of the shareholders' investment).
52. Courts' reluctance to second-guess the decisions of a corporation's board
of directors stems from the "cardinal precept . . . that directors, rather than
shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation." Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). Thus, "the business judgment rule is an
acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives" of corporate directors. Id. at
812. See also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (stating that
the court will not interfere with board's decision, even when majority of shareholders oppose decision, "because directors, not shareholders, are charged with
the duty to manage" the corporation).
53. The business judgment rule in English common law can be traced to a
1742 case, Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Eng. Rep. 400, 404 (1742). Bartley A.
Brennan, Current Developments Surrounding the Business Judgment Rule: A
"Race to the Bottom" Theory of CorporationLaw Revived, 12 WHITTIER L. REV.
299, 301 & n.6 (1991). The Louisiana Supreme Court was the first American
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presumes that directors of a corporation make business decisions
"on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action was taken in the best interests of the company. '54 Thus, the
court will respect the judgment of the board of directors, unless the
party challenging the board's decision can establish facts which rebut the presumption that the directors made a good faith decision.55
This is an extremely difficult task.
In Aronson v. Lewis,56 the Delaware Supreme Court stated two
principles which govern the application of the business judgment
rule. First, the business judgment rule does not protect a director
who has breached the duty of loyalty; only disinterested directors
can claim the protection of the rule.5

7

Directors who appear on

both sides of a transaction or who expect any personal gain from
the challenged decision cannot seek the benefit of the business
judgment rule's presumption that they acted in good faith.58 Second, the court will only use the business judgment rule to protect
court to set out the business judgment rule as a principle of corporate law. Id.
at 301. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's statement of the business judgment
rule in 1853 is strikingly similar to the understanding of the rule today: "a board
of directors acting in good faith and with reasonable care and diligence who
nevertheless falls into mistake ...[is] not liable for the consequences of such a
mistake." Id., citing Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 3 R.I. 9, 18 (1853).
Illinois courts have interpreted the business judgment rule in three leading
cases. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. 1968) (stating that
"the courts cannot require [directors] to forego their judgment" and "follow the
lead of other corporations in the field" absent a "clear showing of dereliction of
duty" on the part of the directors); Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc.,
435 N.E.2d 712, 722 (Ill. App. 1982) (holding that "a director will not be held
liable for mere errors in judgment as long as decision does not involve fraud,
illegality, or conflict of interest"); Fields v. Sax, 462 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ill. App.
1984) (noting that when actions are corporate decisions "which fall within the
purview of the business judgment rule," the court has no authority to "substitute its judgment for the lawful decisions of the directors").
54. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
55. Id. (demonstrating that courts will respect the decision of a board of
directors unless plaintiffs can show that the directors abused their discretion by
violating either their duty of care or their duty of loyalty).
56. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
57. Id. at 812 (stating that if directors will enjoy a "personal financial benefit" which will not "devolve upon the corporation or all stockholders generally,"
the court will consider them "interested" directors and will not presume that
the interested directors acted in the best interest of the corporation). See also
Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (stating that directors' fiduciary relationship to the corporation and to its shareholders demands that directors not
"use their position ... to further their private interests" at the expense of the
corporation).
58. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. (illustrating that courts will not apply the
business judgment rule to a decision which confers a personal benefit on interested directors, unless the decision was approved by a majority of directors who
did not benefit from the decision). See also Thomas A. D'Ambrosio, Note, The
Duty of Care and the Duty of Loyalty in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 40 VAND. L. REV. 663, 687-88 (1987) (discussing the question of the
burden of proof once a disinterested board has approved a decision made by
interested directors and arguing that the burden of proving that the decision
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an informed decision.5 9 Directors who seek the business judgment
60
rule's protection, therefore, have a duty to be well-informed.
Prior to making a decision, directors must take into account all material information reasonably available to them. 61 Once they have
obtained and considered the information, the directors must "act
with requisite care in the discharge of their duties. '62 The Aronson
court established the Delaware standard of care under the business
judgment rule as gross negligence.6 3 Therefore, in order to prevail
in a suit, shareholders are required to plead and prove gross negligence on the part of directors who allegedly failed to exercise their
fiduciary duty of care. Directors whose actions constitute ordinary
negligence are protected by the business judgment rule.64
should not be protected by the business judgment rule should shift back to the
party attacking the transaction).
59. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (directors have "a duty
to inform themselves" prior to making a decision).
60. Id. See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of CorporateDirectors and Officers, 51 U. PITr. L. REV. 945, 958-59 (1990) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
The Duty of Care] (discussing the conditions for the application of the business
judgment rule and describing the following considerations which determine
whether a director has "reasonably informed himself" prior to making a decision: "[the] scale of the decision, [the] time available to make it, the cost involved, and the confidence the director... can reasonably have in analyses and
recommendations of subordinates").
61. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. See also Eisenberg, The Duty of Care, supra
note 60, at 958-59 (discussing the amount of time the directors had to make a
decision as a factor in determining whether the directors took into account information "reasonably available" and suggesting that directors "compelled...
to act in a matter of hours" may meet the standard on the basis of less inquiry
than would be required if several weeks were available for inquiry).
62. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. The degree of care required varies widely.
FEUER, supra note 42, at 29-30. The standard applied ranges from "that degree
of care an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in managing his own affairs" to a standard under which directors "will be liable only for 'gross negligence.' " Id. At the furthest extreme, some courts have held that directors are
not liable for failure to exercise requisite care, "unless they are guilty of 'actual
or constructive fraud.'" Id.
63. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. In a footnote to the opinion, the Aronson
court observed that despite the fact that the "standard by'which the exercise of
business judgment is governed" has been articulated in varying language in Delaware cases, "a long line of Delaware cases holds that director liability is predicated on a standard which is less exacting than simple negligence." Id. at 812
n.6. As examples of the standards used, the Aronson court cited Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) ("fraud or gross over-reaching"); Getty
Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970) ("gross and palpable overreaching"); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966) ("bad faith...
or a gross abuse of discretion"); Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 190 A.2d 749, 750 (Del.
1963) ("fraud or gross abuse of discretion"); Penn Mart Realty v. Becker, 298
A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972) ("grossly negligent"); Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136,
140 (Del. Ch. 1960) ("fraud, misconduct or abuse of discretion"); and Allaun v.
Consol. Oil Co., 147 A.2d 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929) ("reckless indifference to or a
deliberate disregard of the stockholders"). Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 n.6.
64. See McMurray, supra note 41, at 615 (describing protection of business
judgement rule for "acts short of gross negligence or fraud").
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Given the presumption in favor of the validity of directors' decisions, few shareholders in any jurisdiction succeeded in suits
against directors for a breach of the duty of care.65 Indeed, as one
critic has described it, trying to find cases in which shareholders
have successfully sued directors of industrial corporations for negligence is like looking for "a very small number of needles in a very
large haystack."
Thus, the application of the business judgment
rule reinforced the effect of 19th century corporate governance
structure and prevented shareholders from exerting control over
the corporation. Part C will examine a major change in corporate
governance that offered shareholders a new way to protect their
interests.
C. Outside Directorsas Representatives of ShareholderInterests
In the mid-1970s, in response to the threat that the federal government might preempt state regulation of corporations, the legal
profession proposed changes in corporate governance that would
address the problem of corporate control. 67 Specifically, the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association's Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law redefined the role
of the board of directors set forth in the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act ("RMBCA") to reflect the reality that the board
oversees, rather than manages, the corporation. 68 In the Corporate
Director's Guidebook, published in 1978, the Committee on Corporate Laws defined important new responsibilities for outside directors who were to serve explicitly as independent monitors of the
board of directors and as representatives of the interests of the
shareholders and recommended that the majority of a corporation's
board be made up of outside directors. 69 The new definitions of the
board of directors and the role of the outside directors reflects the
65. Thomas C. Lee, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's
Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors'Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 239, 240 (1987) (discussing the paucity of cases in which directors were
found liable solely on negligence grounds and concluding that the duty of care is
a doctrine "whose bark is worse than its bite").
66. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in
the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078,
1099 (1968). See also Thomas Lee Hazen, CorporateDirectors'Accountability:
The Race to the Bottom -The Second Lap, 66 N.C. L. REV. 171, 171 n.5 (1987)
(describing as "only a handful" the number of cases holding directors accountable for breach of duty of care "in situations not raising questions of divided loyalty" and finding only six such instances "since the inception of American
corporate law").
67. Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw, supra note 19, at 20911.
68. See Guidebook, supra note 4, at 1606-07.
69. See id. at 1623-25.
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reality of the modern corporation. 70
The RMBCA recognizes that the board of directors no longer
7 1
directly manages the affairs of large, publicly-held corporations.
Rather, the role of the board of directors is to review and monitor
the performance of management. 72 The special role of the outside
director is to serve as an independent, disinterested monitor who
can maintain an arm's-length relationship with inside directors and
73
other members of management.
70. See Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw, supra note 19, at
205 (describing the primary functions of a modern board of directors as selecting chief executive officer and other top managers and monitoring their overall
conduct of the corporation, rather than actually managing the day-to-day business of the corporation).
71. Under the Model Business Corporation Act, the board of directors exercised all corporate powers and managed the business and affairs of the corporation. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1950) (emphasis added). By
contrast, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act provides for alternative
management roles for the board of directors. RMBCA § 8.01(b) (1991). Under
the revised section, the board may still exercise corporate powers and manage
the corporation directly. Id. However, the revision also provides for an alternative situation in which the board oversees, rather than manages, the corporation. See RMBCA § 8.01(b) (1991). Thus, corporate powers may be exercised
"under the authority of" the board and the corporation's business and affairs
may be "managed under the direction of" the board of directors. Id. (emphasis
added).
The revised section 8.01(b) codifies the expectation that directors of large,
publicly-held corporations will not participate in the day-to-day management of
the corporation. See Guidebook, supra note 4, at 1607. Although directors may
still initiate policy, for the most part, management will develop and implement
basic corporate objectives which the board will review and evaluate. Id. at 160607.
72. The primary function of the board is to select the key members of the
management team and then to monitor and oversee their performance. Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw, supra note 19, at 205. The board
should continually assess the efficiency of management. Id. In addition, the
board should be alert to whether management is running the corporation in
accordance with the standards of law and ethics. Id.
The outside directors of General Motors Corporation recently demonstrated their power to effect change in management on behalf of the shareholders. Steve Lohr, Party Seems Over For Chief Executives, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Apr. 13, 1992, § 1, at 1. The outside directors ousted General Motors' chairman
and chief executive officer, Robert Stempel, from his position as head of the
executive committee of the General Motors board and replaced him with an
outside director. Id. Lohr described this action as an example of the growing
power and independence of outside directors as watchdogs over management on
behalf of shareholders. Id. On October 26, 1992, Robert Stempel resigned from
the position of chairman and chief executive officer of General Motors in response to continued pressure from GM outside directors. Jim Mateja and Stephen Franklin, Boardroom Coup at GM, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 1992, s.1, at 1. See
also Nancy Ryan, New Assertiveness Challenges "Pet Rock", Rubber Stamp
Images, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1992, s.3, at 1 (describing Stempel resignation as
evidence that the higher percentage of outside directors had led to a new assertiveness on the part of corporate boards).
73. Commentators disagree regarding the appropriate stance of the outside
director with respect to inside directors and management. For example, according to the American Bar Association, the outside director functions as a monitor
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The importance of the disinterested outside director is most apparent in change of ownership situations, such as proposed takeovers.7 4 In these situations, the interests of inside directors, who
seek to protect their jobs, are most likely to come into conflict with
the interests of shareholders, who seek the highest price for their
shares of stock. By contrast, outside directors, whose livelihoods
are not at stake, can assess the situation in a disinterested way and
can act to protect shareholders' interests in maximizing profits.
Even when the ownership of the corporation is not at stake, the
disinterested outside director is in a better position than inside directors to protect shareholder interests in at least three ongoing
functions of the board: auditing financial reports of management's
performance, determining the compensation paid to management,
75
and identifying nominees for positions on the board of directors.
In all three areas, inside directors' interests are likely to conflict
with the interests of shareholders. Because the possibility of conflict of interest is great, shareholders are better served when
"in an environment of loyal but independent oversight" and "in a framework of
collaborative support to operating management." Guidebook, supra note 4, at
1621. A less congenial approach regards the outside directors' power to oust
management as the basis for outside directors to "goad" managers to effectively
maximize shareholder profits and to insure management integrity in the division of "corporate assets between themselves and stockholders." Victor Brudney, The IndependentDirector- Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 597, 602 (1982). The Securities and Exchange Commission appears to
see the relationship between the outside director and management as an almost
adversarial one. See Morgan E. Shipman, Role of Outside Director Distinguished from that of Inside Director, in DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
OUTSIDE DIREcTORs 41, 52-54 (Avery S. Cohen & Ronald M. Loeb eds., 1978)
(describing the SEC's delineation of outside directors' duties as a "very demanding arms-length standard").
74. The Delaware Supreme Court has described the special difficulty involved in the takeover bid as "the omnipresent specter" that inside directors,
faced with a threat to their control of the corporation, may act in their own
interests rather than in the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). Similarly,
the interest of an ineffective or incapacitated chief executive officer who seeks
to maintain his position is in direct conflict with shareholders' interest in having the corporation run by the most talented and capable person available. See
Pease, supra note 4, at 33-34. Because there is an inherent conflict of interest in
the decision to replace an officer or to select new corporate officers or managers, outside directors should play a central role in these processes. Guidebook,
supra note 4, at 1625.
75. The audit committee recommends the firm which will serve as the corporation's outside auditor, consults with that firm on the plan for the audit,
reviews the audit report and consults periodically with the auditors regarding
the adequacy of internal financial control procedures. Guidebook, supra note 4,
at 1626. The compensation committee recommends to the board the compensation to be paid to the corporation's senior management. Id. The nominating
committee recommends to the board persons to fill board vacancies. Id. As part
of the nominating process, the committee should solicit recommendations from
shareholders. Id.
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outside, rather than inside, directors are responsible for the board
committees on auditing, compensation, and nominations.
The courts, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
New York Stock Exchange have all recognized the importance of
the role played by disinterested outside directors. Courts have recognized outside directors' special role by according "enhanced" validity to decisions made by boards comprised of a majority of outside
directors. 76 The Securities and Exchange Commission has demonstrated its confidence in the role of outside directors by ordering a
corporation to add outside directors to its board to oversee the corporation's financial reporting and to settle conflict of interest claims
brought against the corporation's inside directors, officers, and employees. 77 The New York Stock Exchange underscores the importance of outside directors by requiring all corporations whose
shares are traded on the Exchange to have at least two outside directors and to have an audit committee comprised of outside
78
directors.
Corporations have also recognized the value of outside direc76. Especially in takeover situations, the presence of outside directors on
the board and their active involvement in the decision-making process often
persuades the court that the board's decision was the product of reasonable investigation and was not colored by self-interest. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that the inference that a board had
reasonable grounds for purchasing shares with corporate funds was "materially
enhanced" if the board had a majority of outside directors). See also Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co. 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir. 1981) (observing that when a
board acts to prevent a takeover, the presumption of good faith is heightened if
the majority of the board is comprised of independent outside directors); Polk v.
Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (stating that the presence of 10 outside directors on board of directors plus the advice of an investment banker and an attorney constituted a prima facie showing of good faith and reasonable
investigation); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. 1971) (holding that the
court will not substitute its opinion of valuation of stock for the opinion of "experienced, independent board members").
The presumption of good faith may be denied when the majority of the
board is not comprised of independent outside directors. See Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 176 n.3 (Del. 1986) (refusing to accord
the presumption of good faith that generally attaches to decisions by boards
having a majority of "truly independent directors" to a board where six of the
14 members were senior managers of the company, two others held significant
amounts of the company's stock, and four had business relationships with the
company).
77. See SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,754 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 1974).
78. Companies which seek to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange
must have a minimum of two outside directors. Pease, supra note 4, at 30. In
addition, as a condition of continued listing on the Exchange, a company must
have an audit committee "composed of one or more directors who are independent of management" and in a position to exercise independent judgment. Id.
See also BISHOP, infra note 79, § 1.03 at 7 (specifying that audit committee must
be composed entirely of outside directors to comply with New York Stock Exchange requirement).
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tors.79 A 1986 survey revealed that the average board of directors

was comprised of ten outside directors and four inside directors.8 0
In 1991, the survey showed that the average board included nine
outside directors and three inside directors. 8 ' From the shareholders' point of view, the outside directors who monitor the performance of management on an ongoing basis provide a valuable check
and balance device which helps to represent the interests of the
82
shareholder.
II.

THE 1985-1990 DIRECTORS' LIABILITY CRISIS

In 1984, outside corporate directors could feel certain that the
business judgment rule would protect them against personal liabil83
ity for business decisions which ultimately proved erroneous.
Moreover, the availability of director and officer liability insurance
provided assurance that even if directors were held liable for a
breach of their fiduciary duty, they would not be forced to pay damages from their own resources.8 4 However, by the mid-1980s, in an
economic environment shaped by rapidly increasing merger and acquisition activity, these certainties were swept away by judicial decisions that undermined the security provided by the business
judgment rule.85 The resulting directors' liability crisis became a
79. Outside directors now constitute the majority on the boards of most
publicly-held corporations and virtually no publicly-held corporation has a
board made up entirely of inside directors. JOSEPH BISHOP, JR., LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 1.03 at 7

(1988).
80.

KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, BOARD OF DIRECTORS' THIRTEENTH AN-

NUAL STUDY 4, 13 (Feb. 1986), cited in Pease, supra note 4, at 35.

81. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, BOARD OF DIRECTORS' EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL STUDY 5, 15 (June 1991).
82. For an argument challenging the effectiveness of outside directors as
representatives of shareholders' interests, see MONKS & MINOW, supra note 31,
at 73-107.
83. See e.g. Harvey Gelb, DirectorDue Care Liability: An Assessment of the
New Statutes, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 13, 14-17 (1988) (describing business rule as one
reason prospective corporate directors could feel confident that directors would
not be held liable for violations of the duty of care).
84. State corporation statutes may permit corporations to indemnify corporate directors for expenses and liabilities they incur in connection with corporate duties. Karen L. Chapman, Note, Statutory Responses To Boardroom
Fears,1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 749, 751 (1987). Corporations purchase director
and officer liability insurance to reimburse the corporation for indemnification
costs it pays to its officers and directors. Id. Corporations can also buy a type of
director and officer insurance to pay liability amounts for which directors and
officers are not indemnified. Id.
85. See Mark A. Sargent, Two Cheersfor the Maryland Directorand Officer
Liability Statute, 18 BALT. L. REV. 278, 294 (1989) (describing uncertainty generated by Van Gorkom and other decisions that "appeared to erode fundamental tenets and to increase the risk that duty of care claims would go to the jury"
and arguing that this uncertainty led to the realization that courts could force
further change, making the future unpredictable); Stephen A. Radin, The Di-
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dominant concern in corporate law for the next five years.8 6
Beginning in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court created substantial uncertainty by handing down a series of opinions which appeared to significantly change the application of the business
judgment rule.8 7 All the cases involved shareholder challenges to
corporate takeovers.8 8 Undoubtedly, the most notable of these
rector's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J.
707, 707 (1988) (describing the Van Gorkom court's refusal to accord directors
the protection of the business judgment rule as a shock to the corporate world
that provoked extensive commentary in both general media and law journals,
much of which predicted "dire consequences"); Gelb, supra note 83 at 23 (discussing several recent developments which produced particularly deep anxieties about serving on a board of directors and describing Van Gorkom as "one of
the most traumatic of the developments"); Kristin A. Linsley, Comment, Statutory Limitationson Directors'Liability in Delaware:A New Look at Cotflicts
of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 527
(1987) (describing Van Gorkom as "blowing a hole in" the business judgment
rule, which had long been corporate directors' primary shield from liability, and
thereby sending a "shockwave across corporate America"); R. Link Newcomb,
Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A Proposal For Legislative Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411, 411-12 (1987) (describing the difficulty corporations
had in retaining outside directors after Van Gorkom and noting that fear of
liability was the primary reason that directors resigned from the boards of several major corporations); Lynne A. Whited, Note, CorporateDirectors- An Endangered Species? A More Reasonable Standard for Director and Officer
Liability in Illinois, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 495, 502 (1987) (describing Van
Gorkom as sending a "strong message to corporate directors that the business
judgment rule was no longer an impenetrable shield"); Jonathan W. Groessl,
Delaware's New Section 102(b)(7): Boon or Bane for CorporateDirectors?, 37
DEPAUL L. REV. 411, 429 (1988) (describing three factors which made corporations less likely to attract qualified outside directors: a decline in the scope and
availability of director and officer liability insurance, the willingness of courts
to impose personal liability on directors, and a volatile environment in which
directors faced an increased likelihood of litigation).
86. Concern with directors' liability was not confined to the legal community. Business publications carried many articles on the directors' liability crisis. Groessl, supra note 85, at 429, nn.122, 125, citing Laurie Baumahrons, The
Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56; Business Struggles to Adapt as
Insurance Crisis Spreads, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 31; DirectorInsurance
Drying Up, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1986, at 1; InsurersBeginning to Refuse Coverage on Directorsand Officers in Takeover Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 3;
Liability Insuranceis Difficult to FindNow for Directors,WALL ST. J., July 10,
1985, at 10.
87. See supra note 85 for a discussion of the perception that courts' interpretations of the business judgment rule in Van Gorkom and other cases would
mean greater liability exposure for corporate directors.
88. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 863 (Del. 1985); MacAndrews &
Forbes Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (finding that directors' decision to enter a "lock-up" agreement with a potential buyer of the corporation
breached fiduciary duty and requiring directors to hold an auction to obtain the
highest price for company, once the sale of the company had become inevitable); Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (recognizing an
"enhanced duty" for directors adopting a defensive mechanism in a takeover
context and imposing a two-prong test whereby directors seeking the protection
of the business judgment rule must show reasonable grounds for believing the
company was endangered and that the defensive mechanism they adopted was
reasonable in relation to the threat posed).
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cases was Smith v. Van Gorkom, 9 in which the Delaware Supreme
Court held directors of Trans-Union Corporation personally liable
to the Trans-Union shareholders for $23.5 million in monetary damages. 90 Apparently following the standard enunciated in Aronson,
the Van Gorkom court found the directors of Trans-Union grossly
negligent for approving the sale of the company to Jay Pritzker's
Marmon Group after deliberating for only two hours, without ever
seeing the actual Merger Agreement, and without establishing a
value for the company or its shares. 91 The court based its conclusion solely on the process the directors used to make the decision,
not on the substance of the decision. 92 The court found the directors' decision-making process inadequate. 93 Therefore, the court
did not consider the directors' decision an "informed decision" and
thus, the court did not afford the protection of the business judg94
ment rule to the decision.
The award of monetary damages in Van Gorkom represented a
striking departure from the court's traditional reluctance to find directors liable for duty of care violations. 95 In fact, the Van Gorkom
court stated explicitly that the decision rested solely on the conclusion that the directors had violated their fiduciary duty of care,
rather than their duty of loyalty.96 Indeed, the court observed that
the plaintiff shareholders never alleged that the directors' actions
constituted "fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing," i.e., violation of the
duty of loyalty. 97 Essentially, the court presumed that the directors
had made the decision to sell the company in good faith and never
89. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
90. The court set as the measure of damages "the extent that the fair market value of Trans-Union exceeds [the sale price of] $55 per share." Id. at 893.
Ultimately, the parties reached an out-of-court settlement with the approval of
the Delaware Chancery Court. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, supra note 25, at
679 n.14. Under the terms of the settlement, the directors of Trans-Union paid
damages of $23.5 million. Id. Of this amount, $10 million was provided through
the defendants' director and officer liability insurance. Id. According to rumor,
the bulk of the balance of the settlement fund was provided by the Pritzkers,
the purchasers of Trans-Union. Id.
91. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985). See supra notes 5664 and accompanying text for a discusison of Aronson.
92. See infra note 101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Van
Gorkom court's scrutiny of the decision-making process rather than the substance of the directors' business decision.
93. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 878.
94. Id. at 888. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in Aronson, the court
will apply the business judgment rule only to informed decisions. See supra
notes 59-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirement that directors inform themselves prior to making a decision.
95. Lee supra notes 65-66, at 240 (discussing the extremely limited number
of cases in which courts have found corporate directors liable for violations of
the duty of care in the absence of violations of the duty of loyalty).
96. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
97. Id.
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inquired into the directors' motives. 98 The Van Gorkom court's focus on the directors' duty of care, rather than their duty of loyalty,
represented a sharp break from the traditional application of the
business judgment rule.
Ostensibly, Van Gorkom did not change the business judgment
rule or the directors' standard of care stated one year earlier in Aronson.99 In fact, the Van Gorkom court cited Aronson when it
stated that the plaintiff has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the directors' decision is an informed decision.100 However, by subjecting the directors' decision-making process to
painstakingly close scrutiny and concluding that the directors had
forfeited the protection of the business judgment rule because the
process itself was flawed, the Van Gorkom court, in effect, established a new standard.' 0 ' Under the new Van Gorkom standard,
courts must examine the decision-making process in great detail to
determine whether the directors adequately informed themselves.10 2 The Van Gorkom decision created the perception among
the business and legal communities that directors could no longer
assume they would be protected under the business judgment rule.
This closer judicial scrutiny of directors' decisions came at a
time when corporate directors were increasingly called upon to decide questions involving multi-billion dollar mergers and acquisitions.' 0 3 They also coincided with, and aggravated, the growing
98. Id. at 872-73.
99. Indeed, the Van Gorkom court repeatedly cited Aronson regarding the
business judgment rule and the standard of care. See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d at 872-73 (describing the business judgment rule as a presumption that
directors "acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company" and describing the
applicable standard of care as "gross negligence").
100. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
101. In 1989, the Delaware Chancery Court described the new standard of
director due care which courts had used since Van Gorkom. Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 56 (Del. 1989). The focus of the
court's due care examination is the board's decision-making process. Id. The
court must seek evidence that the board acted in a "deliberate and knowledgeable way" in finding and pursuing alternatives. Id. In making a decision, a board
cannot rely solely on "hired experts" and management. Id. The Delaware
Chancery Court identified three elements which the court must examine when
reviewing the applicability of the business judgement rule: the board's objective financial interests, i.e., its independence; the board's subjective motivations,
i.e., its good faith; and the process by which it reached its decision, i.e., its due
care (emphasis added). In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders' Litigation, [19881989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, 91,700, 91,709 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 31, 1989).
102. See supra note 101 for a discussion of the Van Gorkom standard.
103. See RUKEYSER, supra note 17, at 244 (showing total merger and acquisition activity from 1980 to 1990 and total leveraged buyout activity from 1980 to
1990).
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crisis in the availability of directors' liability insurance.10 4 Insurers,
fearing an increase in liability exposure, either refused to provide
coverage for corporate directors or provided insurance at sharply
increased premiums over 1984 rates.105
The award of monetary damages in Van Gorkom triggered a
national panic among directors and prospective directors. 10 6 Their

concerns were two-fold. First, corporate managers, the corporate
bar, and commentators feared that qualified persons would refuse
to serve as outside corporate directors rather than expose themselves to the possibility of personal liability.10 7 Second, these same
parties contended that even if qualified persons agreed to serve as
directors, they would react to the threat of personal liability by
making overly conservative, risk-averse decisions that would ultimately be harmful to the interests of the corporation. 10 8 These concerns led the Delaware legislature to enact its director liability
09
statute.'
104. R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of
DirectorLiability for Delaware Corporations,12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 6 (1987).
For a discussion of the crisis in the availability of director and officer liability
insurance and the impact of Van Gorkom and its progeny on the insurance crisis, see Roberta Romano, CorporateGovernance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis,39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1158-60 (1989) [hereinafter Romano, Corporate
Governance] (discussing increases in the demand for director and officer (D &
0) liability insurance, the number of lawsuits against corporate boards, and the
costs of claims against directors as factors which contributed to the insurance
crisis and describing Van Gorkom as an example of "the legal uncertainty" that
contributed to the crisis by making it difficult for insurers to predict their potential losses); Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance?,14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Romano,
What Went Wrong?] (discussing in great detail the factors within the insurance industry that led to the insurance crisis, such as the limited number of
companies in the D & 0 market; the dramatic shifts in market share among
insurers; and a peak in the competitive cycle in the mid-1980s, and showing how
judicial decisions altered allocation of risk, thereby further aggravating the situation by reducing predictability); Sara Slaughter, Comment, Statutory and NonStatutory Responses to the Directorand Officer Liability Insurance Crisis, 63
IND. L.J. 181 (1987-88) (describing the insurance crisis, the adoption of new indemnification statutes by various states, and the measures adopted by corporations to cope with the insurance crisis).
105. See Romano, What Went Wrong?, supra note 104, at 1-2.
106. See, e.g., English, supra note 42, at 2.
107. See Balotti & Gentile, supra note 104, at 6-9.
108. See, e. g., Secretary Edgar'sBusiness CorporationAct Advisory Committee on Proposed Changes Regarding Director and Officer Liability Requests
Comments, ISBA CORP. & SEC., Oct. 1986, at 1.
109. The legislative intent behind Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code is

stated explicitly in the legislative synopsis to the statute. The synopsis states in
pertinent part that section 102(b)(7) is a "legislative response to recent changes in the market for directors' liability insurance" which have
"threatened the quality and stability of the governance of Delaware corporations because directors have become unwilling ... to serve without the protection which such insurance provides and . . . may be deterred by the

unavailability of such insurance from making entrepreneurial decisions." Synopsis to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7), reprinted in Pease, supra note 4,
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THE DELAWARE DIRECTOR LIABILITY STATUTE

A.

Delaware'sSection 102(b)(7)

In 1985, the Delaware State Bar Association formed a committee to propose measures to alleviate the director liability crisis and
to counteract the perception that serving on a corporate board of
directors exposed directors to enormous liability.1 10 After studying
several possible approaches to the problem," 1 the committee
drafted an amendment to Section 102 of the Delaware General Corporation Act. 112 The amendment, hereinafter referred to as Section
102(b)(7), would enable Delaware corporations to include in their
certificate of incorporation, either initially or by amendment, a provision which would eliminate or limit director liability for breach of
the fiduciary duty of care. 113 The Council of the Corporate Law
Section of the Delaware State Bar Association proposed the amend-4
ment, which was approved by section members on May 14, 1986.11
The bill was introduced and passed by both the House and Senate
app. at 101-02.

The synopsis concludes that section 102(b)(7) is intended "to

allow Delaware corporations to provide substitute protection ... to their directors and to limit director liability under certain circumstances." Id.
110. Groessl, supra note 85, at 429 (describing the formation of the Delaware
State Bar Association committee to develop a response to the director liability
crisis).
111. The committee first considered a bill that would approach the problem
by greatly expanding the power of Delaware corporations to provide indemnification for their directors and officers. Groessl, supra note 85, at 429.
112. Ultimately, the committee drafted the bill which became section
102(b)(7), because they considered it to be a "more direct approach" to the problem which would "fit well within the traditional enabling character of section
102." Groessl, supra note 85, at 430-31.
113. The statute amends Article 8 of the Delaware General Corporation Act
and provides in pertinent part as follows:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the following matters:...
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director
(i)For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation
or its stockholders,
(ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law,
(iii) under § 174 of this title; or
(iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date
when such provision becomes effective. All references in this paragraph to a director shall also be deemed to refer to a member of the
governing body of a corporation which is not authorized to issue capital
stock.
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(1986).
114. Pease, supra note 4, at 90.
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and signed into law within three days. 115
came effective on July 1, 1986.116

The new provision be-

115. Groessl, supra note 85, at 441 n.190.
116. Id. Since Delaware adopted section 102(b)(7), 35 other states have enacted statutes which follow the Delaware "permissive" charter option model,
enabling corporations to include a director liability provision in their articles of
incorporation. The following director liability statutes are similar in form to
Section 102(b)(7): ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.480 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1054(A)(9)(1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3) (Michie Supp. 1987); CAL.
CORP. CODE §§ 204(a)(10), 204.5 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-101(1)(u) (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4) (Michie 1989);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-48.5 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 1989);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.832 (Special Pamphlet 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 176002(b)(8) (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B-2-020(2)(d) (Baldwin 1989); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(4) (Supp. 1991); MD. CORPS. & ASSNS' CODE ANN. §§ 2104(b)(8), 405.2 (Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1-1/2) (Supp.
1990); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(209)(c) (Callaghan 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.1209(c) (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(4) (West Supp. 1989-90);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-202(2)(a)(v)(2) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035(2)
(Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037 (Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 293-A:54(I-a) (Supp. 1989); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:2-7(3) (Supp. 1990); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(E) (Michie Supp. 1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(7) (West Supp.
1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(c)(1988); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364 (Purdon
Supp. 1990) R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(6) (Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 47-2-58.8 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (1988); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06(B) (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 1610-49.1. (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B-02-020(5)(i)- § 23B-08-320 (Supp.
1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-16-834 (1989). MARK A. SARGENT, D&O LIABILITY
HANDBOOK: LAW - SAMPLE DOCUMENTS - FORMS xiii-xxiv (1991-92) [hereinafter
SARGENT, HANDBOOK].

Other states have taken an approach which differs from the Delaware
model. Instead of enacting permissive legislation, these states have changed
their statutory standards of a director's duty of care or their standards of culpability for breach of the duty of care. See EDWARD BRODSKY & H. PATRICIA
ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND
LIABILITIES § 2.05 at 18-20 (1986).
The effect of such statutory changes is to

make directors' liability protection mandatory.

SARGENT, HANDBOOK,

supra at

12-1 (describing Indiana liability limitation as "self-executing," i.e., the limitaiton applies automatically, without a vote of shareholders and the corporation may not "opt out of the limitation").
See also Romano, Corporate
Governance, supra note 104 at 1160 (describing the Indiana statute lowering
directors' standard of care as applying "automatically to all firms" incorporated
in the state, without giving shareholders of Indiana firms the option of retaining
liability for director negligence). As examples of other states' laws, see VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Michie 1989) (holding directors to their "good faith
judgment of the best interests of the corporation," rather than "the care of an
ordinarily prudent person"); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Burns 1989) (retaining the requirement that a director act with the care of an ordinarily prudent person but requiring proof of willful misconduct or recklessness to find a
director personally liable for a breach of the duty of care); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 716 A (West Supp. 1989) (limiting personal liability unless the director
acted dishonestly or not in the "reasonable belief that the action was in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation or its shareholders"); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.0831 (West Supp. 1991) (director will not be held liable for monetary
damages in a stockholders' derivative action unless the breach of the duty of
care constitutes "conscious disregard for the best interest of the corporation, or
willful misconduct"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Page Supp. 1989) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence that the director's act or omis-
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Section 102(b)(7) permits a corporation to include in its certificate of incorporation a provision eliminating or limiting a director's
personal liability to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of the director's duty of care. 1 1 7 Section
102(b)(7) states explicitly that protection under the statute does not
extend to a breach of "the director's duty of loyalty," nor to "acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct
or a knowing violation of the law. 11 8 Nor can the corporation protect a director from liability "for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit." 119
Besides limiting section 102(b)(7) protection to breaches of the
directors' duty of care section 102(b)(7) may extend only to monetary damages, not to equitable remedies such as injunction or rescission.120
Protection under section 102(b)(7) is also limited to
shareholder class action or derivative suits. 12 1

Thus, it does not

eliminate the possibility of monetary damages in actions brought by
122
third parties.
Section 102(b)(7) applies only to directors. 123 It does not provide protection for "officers, employees, or agents of a corporation."'124 Also, it applies solely to directors acting in their capacity
as directors. 125 Thus, if a person is both legal counsel to a corporation and a director, she is not protected against liability for acts or
omissions in her capacity as legal counsel, but only for acts or omission was "undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the
corporation").
117. See supra note 109 for a discussion of the legislative intent behind DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986).
118. Synopsis to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)((7), reprinted in Pease,
supra note 4, app. at 101-02.
119. Id.
120. Id. Although equitable remedies may be effective in the context of
proxy disputes, elections to the board of directors, removal of directors, or resignation of directors, equitable remedies are only meaningful if stockholders are
aware of corporate actions before they have been completed. Balotti & Gentile,
supra note 104, at 16. Thus, as a practical matter, the unavailability of monetary
damages may leave stockholders with "no effective remedy for injury occasioned by the directors' action." Id.
121. Balotti & Gentile, supra note 104, at 12.
122. Id.
123. Id. Unlike section 102(b)(7), director liability statutes in several states
do extend protection against personal liability for monetary damages to officers
of the corporation. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020(1)(d) (Baldwin 1989);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(4) (West Supp. 1991); MD.CORPS. & ASSNS' CODE
ANN., §§ 2-104(b)(8) and 405.2 (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037 (Supp.
1989); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (Supp. 1990) as cited in BRODSKY &
ADAMSKI, supra note 116, at n.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
124. Balotti & Gentile, supra note 104, at 12.
125. Id.
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sions in her capacity as a director. 1 26
The enactment of section 102(b)(7) did not automatically protect directors of Delaware corporations because section 102(b)(7) is
merely an enabling statute. 1 27 Thus, section 102(b)(7) does not
28
mandate that a corporation institute director liability protection.1
Rather, it permits a corporation to include a limitation on director
liability in its articles of incorporation, either ab initio or by amendment. 1 29 Moreover, a board of directors that decides to amend the
corporation's certificate of incorporation to include a director liability provision must submit the proposed amendment to a vote of the
shareholders. 130
126. Id. (describing section 102(b)(7) as not permitting elimination or limitation of monetary damages for officers, employees, or agents of the corporation).
See also Brennan, supra note 53, at 322 (discussing section 102(b)(7) as applica-

ble only to directors, thus covering director-officers only when they are acting
in their capacity as directors).
127. An "enabling" statute permits persons, corporations, or agencies "to do
what before they could not;" it confers new powers. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
526 (6th ed. 1990).
128. By contrast, some states have enacted statutes which changed the standard of care required of corporate directors. See supra note 116 for a discussion
of statutes which limit the liability of directors of all domestic corporations, as
opposed to statutes which simply permit the state's corporations to protect their
directors by adopting a director liability provision.
129. See supra note 113 for the text of § 102(b)(7).
130. See supra note 113 for the text of § 102(b)(7). A corporation may
amend its certificate of incorporation by submitting a proposed amendment to a
vote of its stockholders at an annual meeting of the corporation or at a special
meeting of stockholders. Balotti & Gentile, supra note 104, at 21. Alternatively, a corporation may seek approval by written consent of its stockholders
under Rule 14-(c)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which was incorporated into Delaware law as section 228 of the General Corporation Law. Balotti
& Gentile, supra note 104, at 22 & n.60. Balotti and Gentile also observe that
director liability provisions may either be written in a form which tracks the
statute or in a broader form which limits liability "to the fullest extent permitted by law." Id. at 20. They note that amendments which track or mirror the
statute are "highly likely" to "withstand judicial scrutiny" and "could require
less stringent disclosure in a proxy or registration statement." Id. The advantage of the broader formulation is that it automatically incorporates broader
protection which may be provided by future legislation. Id. at 20-21. If future
legislation reduces the protection available under a § 102(b)(7) provision, the
reduction would automatically become effective too. Id. at 21.
Balotti and Gentile also note that many corporations which have adopted
an amendment under § 102(b)(7) have included a provision intended to reduce
director uncertainty concerning possible future stockholder action which might
reduce the protection provided under the provision. Id. at 21. Thus many initial
§ 102(b)(7) amendments include the following provision: "Any repeal or modification of the foregoing paragraph shall not adversely affect any right or protection of a Director of the Corporation existing hereunder with respect to any
act or omission occurring prior to or at the time of such repeal or modification."
Id. A corporation which is newly incorporating will, of course, not submit a
liability provision to a vote of shareholders. Linsley, supra note 85, at 533 n.22.
In such an instance the provision will be disclosed in the corporation's prospectus. Id. The situation is not so clear-cut in the case of a corporation which is
reincorporating in Delaware. Id. However, since reincorporations are usually
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Despite the procedural hurdles to securing protection for directors, Delaware corporations responded enthusiastically to the new
director liability statute. 131 Not only did Delaware corporations indicate that they would propose director liability amendments to
their stockholders, but many non-Delaware corporations suggested
that they might seek reincorporation in Delaware to take advantage
132
of the director liability protection offered by section 102(b)(7).
Other states responded to section 102(b)(7) by passing similar
measures, many of them identical to the Delaware statute. 133 In
the year following passage of section 102(b)(7), fifteen states passed
director liability statutes.13 4 By 1991, forty-one states had adopted
statutes intended to protect directors from liability for monetary
damages. 135 Illinois, however, has not yet adopted a director liability statute, despite the efforts of the Illinois corporate bar to enthe result of a merger, a shareholder vote on the merger itself will provide
shareholders the opportunity to vote on whether the articles of incorporation
shall include a director liability provision. Id.
131. Balotti and Gentile note that 75% of the Delaware corporations that responded to a survey conducted by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries indicated that they intended to seek shareholder approval to adopt liabilitylimiting amendments of the type permitted by Section 102(b)(7). Balotti &
Gentile, supra note 104, at 5 n.1, citing 1 Corp. Counsel Weekly (BNA) No. 48,
at 1 (Dec. 10, 1986).
132. The reported reason for the move was that Delaware afforded greater
protection to directors than did Illinois. Groessl, supra note 85, at 444 n.214.
For example, Stone Container Corporation, which was originally incorporated
in Illinois in 1945, reincorporated in Delaware in 1987. FIRST CHICAGO GUIDE:
A SCHOLL CORPORATE GUIDE 192 (Scholl Communications, Inc. ed., 1991). See
also Pease,supra note 4, at 95 (reporting that 7,400 companies incorporated in
Delaware in the three months following the effective date of the director liability statute; a state official attributed the large number to the availability of
§ 102(b)(7) protection for directors).
133. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207,
1210 (1988) (discussing the following states which have adopted charter option
statutes modelled on § 102(b)(7): Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming).
134. Id. at 1246-53 (showing that the following 15 states had passed director
liability statutes by 1987: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming).
135. The following 40 states have enacted some type of director liability statute: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). SARGENT, HANDBOOK, supra
note 116, at xiii-xxiv. Alaska has also enacted a director liability statute. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 116, § 205 (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1991).
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136
courage such a measure.

B.

The Illinois General Assembly's Rejection of Director
Liability Protection

In 1986, the Illinois corporate bar was aware of the director liability crisis. 13 7 They were also aware of the Delaware Legislature's
attempt to solve the problem by passing section 102(b)(7).138 In
September, 1986, the Corporate and Securities Section of the Illinois State Bar Association formed a Task Force to study the issue of
director and officer liability and to recommend action. 139 In December, 1986, the Task Force proposed an amendment to the Illinois Business Corporation Act which was identical to Delaware's
section 102(b)(7). 140 Senator Vince Demuzio introduced the bill in
the Illinois Senate as Senate Bill 1214 in April, 1987. The Senate
passed the measure in May. 141 However, the bill died in the Illinois
136. See infra notes 137-153 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
abortive attempt to pass a director liability statute in Illinois.
137. See English, supra note 142, at 3 (describing director liability statutes
enacted or under consideration in Delaware, Indiana, Missouri and New York
in 1986).
138. The fact that director liability was the focus of the September, October,
and December issues of the Illinois State Bar Association's newsletter for the
Section on Corporation and Securities Law demonstrates the Illinois corporate
bar's concern about the director liability crisis. Similarly, the fact that the text
of the Delaware statute was printed in its entirety in the September issue demonstrates the Illinois corporate bar's awareness of the Delaware director liabilMichael W. Hansen, New Delaware Statutory Provisions
ity statute.
Permitting Limitations on Directors' Liability, 32 ISBA CORP. & SEC., Sept.
1986, at 4, 4.
139. See Secretary Edgar's Business CorporationAct Advisory Committee,
supra note 108, at 1.
140. Thomas N. Jersild, Deliberations and Recommendations of the Task
Force on Directorand Officer Liability to the Secretary of State's Corporation
Act Advisory Committee, 32 ISBA CORP. & SEC., Dec. 1986, at 3.
141. Senator Vince DeMuzio, the assistant majority leader, introduced Senate Bill 1214 on April 10, 1987. LEGIS. SYNOPSIS & DIG., supra note 1 at 268. It
was assigned to the Committee on Finance and Credit Regulations. Id. The
committee recommended passage on May 7 by a vote of 12-1. Id. The Senate
passed the bill on May 22, 1987 by a vote of 58-0. Id. The bill arrived in the
House of Representatives on May 26, where it was sponsored by Representative
John Dunn. Id. It was placed on the House calendar for first reading on May
28. Id. The bill was assigned to the Judiciary Committee, then placed on the
Interim Study Calendar on June 12. Id. Representative Dunn described the
status of a bill in interim study as "in a coma, on life support with the committee's hand on the plug." Telephone Interview with John Dunn, Illinois State
Representative, 101st Dist. (Apr. 9, 1992) [hereinafter Dunn Interview]. Representative Dunn held two public hearings on Senate Bill 1214 in November, 1987,
and sought opinions on Senate Bill 1214 from several law professors. Dunn
Interview, supra. The bill never had a second reading in the House and on May
4, 1988, it was tabled pursuant to House Rule 26D. LEGIS. SYNOPSIS & DIG.,
supra, note 1 at 268. Representative Dunn attributed the death of the bill to
"failure to pursue it in committee." Dunn Interview, supra.
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14 2
House of Representatives the following year.

The Illinois House rejected the director liability amendment
primarily because House members viewed the amendment as a
14 3
"Populist"
measure that took a remedy away from shareholders.
legislators, who were in the majority in the House, saw the amendment as a way for corporate directors to "get off the hook" for their
negligent actions. 4 4 More specifically, the House members who opposed Senate Bill 1214 believed that the amendment would shield
corporate directors from liability for acts which constituted gross
negligence.

145

In addition to philosophical reasons for opposing a director liability statute, the Illinois General Assembly, unlike the Delaware
Legislature, had no economic incentive to pass the director liability

amendment. 146 In Delaware, franchise taxes paid by corporations
incorporated in Delaware are a major source of state revenue. 147 In
142. LEGIS. SYNoPsIs & DIG., supra note 1, at 268.
143. Telephone Interview with Thomas Jersild, a partner at Mayer, Brown
& Platt in Chicago and the chairman of the Task Force on Directors' and Officers' Liability organized by the Corporate and Securities Law Section of the
Illinois State Bar Association (Mar. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Jersild Interview].
144. Jersild Interview, supra note 143.
145. Representative Dunn and the members of the Judiciary Committee
were very aware of Van Gorkom. Dunn Interview, supra note 141. Representative Dunn believed that Senate Bill 1214, which he knew was identical to Delaware's § 102(b)(7) director liability provision, would excuse directors for gross
negligence. Id. Representative Dunn opposed Senate Bill 1214 because he believed the release from liability was too broad. Id. In reaching this conclusion,
Representative Dunn relied on the opinions of several law professors. Id. See,
e. g., Letter from Charles W. Murdock, Professor, Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law, to John Dunn, Illinois State Representative, 101st Dist. (Oct. 26,
1987) (on file with Note author) (describing Senate Bill 1214 as exculpating directors for "conduct which amounts to gross negligence or recklessness" and
proposing an amendment to the bill which would specifically exclude from protection acts which constituted gross negligence or recklessness); Letter from
William H. Painter, Theodore Rinehart Professor of Law, The George Washington University, to John Dunn, Illinois State Representative, 101st Dist. (Sept. 8,
1987) (on file with Note author) (describing Senate Bill 1214 as permitting
shareholders to exculpate both inside and outside directors from personal liability for monetary damages for "acts of negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness" and arguing that members of the Task Force which drafted the bill
were "unreceptive to the protection of shareholder interests"); Letter from William J. Davey, Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, to John Dunn, Illinois State Representative, 101st Dist. (Sept. 11,
1987) (on file with Note author) (describing director liability statutes as a response to Van Gorkom and arguing that Senate Bill 1214 "establishes an unacceptably low standard by which directors' conduct is judged" because the
proposed amendment "would immunize directors for their grossly negligent,
and perhaps even reckless, failure to inform themselves before making a
decision").
146. Jersild Interview, supra note 143.
147. See Seligman, A Brief History, supra note 33, at 282-83 (describing the
importance of the franchise tax to the state of Delaware and observing that in
1971, corporation franchise taxes and related corporate income accounted for
23% of Delaware's total state revenue collections).
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Illinois, however, franchise and license fees are not linked to incorporation in the state.148 Instead, Illinois franchise and license fees
are based on the corporation's economic activity in Illinois. 149 As a
result, all corporations operating in Illinois are required to pay
franchise and license fees at the same rate, regardless of the state in
which they are incorporated. Therefore, Illinois legislators were
not motivated to pass a director liability amendment by the fear
that failure to protect directors would reduce the state's franchise
150
tax and license fee income.
Major corporations operating in Illinois did not actively campaign in favor of director liability protection. 151 They had no incentive to lobby because most of them are not incorporated in
Illinois. 152 They are incorporated in Delaware. 153 As Delaware corporations, they already enjoyed the benefit of Delaware's section
102(b)(7) protection and therefore, had no reason to lobby in favor
of a similar amendment in Illinois.
Resistance to the Delaware statutory model was not confined
to Illinois. Many commentators, critical of Delaware's traditionally
"pro-management" corporate law, view section 102(b)(7) unfavorably.154 Some see the passage of the statute less than one week after
it was introduced as evidence of the Delaware Legislature's uninformed deference to the corporate bar. 155 Others regard the move
148. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 15.20 - 15.75 (1991). Although license
and franchise fees for domestic and foreign corporations are set forth in separate sections of article 15, the provisions are virtually identical. See id.
149. Id.
150. Jersild Interview, supra note 143.
151. Jersild Interview, supra note 143; Telephone Interview with Charles W.
Murdock, Professor, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law (Apr. 14, 1992)
[hereinafter Murdock Interview] (discussing public hearings on Senate Bill 1214
and stating that the only two major Illinois corporations that testified in favor
of the bill were Abbott Laboratories and W. W. Grainger, Inc., which are both
incorporated in Illinois).
152. Of the major corporations headquartered in Illinois, 25 are incorporated
in Illinois, 184 are incorporated in Delaware, and 17 are incorporated in states
other than Illinois and Delaware. Tabulation by Note author of data in FIRST
CHICAGO GUIDE: A SCHOLL CORPORATE GUIDE (Scholl Communications, Inc.
ed., 1991). Among the Delaware-incorporated corporations, 12 reincorporated
in Delaware after the adoption of § 102(b)(7) in 1986. Id. Two of the reincorporating firms were originally incorporated in states other than Illinois. Id. Ten
of the reincorporating firms were originally incorporated in Illinois. Id. A total
of 18 of the 25 largest corporations headquartered in Illinois are incorporated in
Delaware. Id. They include Caterpillar, Inc.; UAL Corporation; Motorola, Inc.;
Ameritech Corporation, CNA Financial Corporation; Baxter International, Inc.;
and Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. Id.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 65, at 272-73 (suggesting that section 102(b)(7)
"opens the floodgates" to the use of puppet directors who will allow management to abuse shareholders' interests).
155. See Groessl, supra note 85, at 441 n.190 (describing the Delaware legislature as being composed of "mostly blue collar" legislators and concluding that
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to place statutory limits on directors' liability as another instance of
Delaware's willingness to adopt any pro-management measure that
will enhance its attractiveness as a state of incorporation, thus protecting the tax revenues and franchise fees which flow into the
15 6
state each year.
While most commentators concede that states are justified in
taking action to insure that qualified outside directors will continue
to serve on corporate boards, many regard the measure adopted by
Delaware as overly generous to directors, at the expense of shareholders.1 5 7 They view the shareholder approval requirement as
meaningless, arguing that most shareholders will simply approve
the proposed amendments "without meaningful bargaining or consent.' 158 Opponents of the measure argue that the approval requirement is inherently flawed because shareholders will not
recognize that approval of a liability limitation amendment constitutes a waiver of their right to bring an action for damages if the
directors fail to exercise their duty of care. 159 However, critics of
section 102(b)(7) have based their objections on the text of the statute, rather than on a judicial interpretation of the statute. In 1991,
more than five years after the Delaware Legislature enacted section
102(b)(7), the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of
director liability protection under the Delaware statute.
the swift enactment of § 102(b)(7) was the result of the Delaware legislature's
"great deference to the Delaware corporate bar"); see also Brennan, supra note
53, at 324 (describing an interest group theory that the enactment of § 102(b)(7)
should be seen simply as a victory for the interest group "which had the lowest
start-up costs to lobby effectively" for the measure; that interest group was the
Delaware bar).
156. See Blank, supra note 32, at 134 (describing § 102(b)(7) as "another
mechanism to lure businesses to incorporate in Delaware," thus assuring Delaware "of continued high income from corporate taxes and fees").
157. See Brennan, supra note 53, at 324 (describing § 102(b)(7) as vindicating
the argument of those who regard Delaware as leading a "race to the bottom"
because the director liability provision "favors management over shareholders"
by providing "a disincentive for directors to act in a way which maximizes
shareholder welfare").
158. See Gelb, supra note 83, at 30 (describing the notion of shareholder
choice as "somewhat illusory" because the approval process does not allow for
"meaningful bargaining or consent," except in corporations in which boards
proposing a § 102(b)(7) provision are concerned "about the attitudes of institutional or other large investors").
159. See Blank, supra note 32, at 132 (discussing the probability that shareholders will not "comprehend the consequences of their waiver" because the
proposal to adopt a director liability provision will be presented in a one-sided
manner, because shareholders may not understand the implications of the provision, or because shareholders may simply approve the proposal without reading it); see also Whited, supra note 85, at 512 (discussing the likelihood that
shareholders, not understanding the import of the proposed director liability
provision, will approve it without realizing that they are waiving protection of
their interests by reducing their rights to sue directors in derivative actions).
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SECTION

102(b)(7)

AS INTERPRETED BY IN RE DATAPRODUCTS
16 0
SHAREHOLDERS' LITIGATION

While the Delaware statute reduced uncertainty and anxiety
among prospective outside directors, the question of whether the
statute as written seriously limits the rights of shareholders can
only be evaluated after judicial interpretation of the statute. In re
DataproductsShareholders'Litigation was the first case to test section 102(b)(7), Delaware's director liability protection statute. 16
Dataproductswas a class action suit brought by shareholders seeking monetary damages against the directors for alleged breaches of
duty in connection with the merger of Dataproducts Corporation

with a subsidiary of Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd. and Nissei Sangya, Ltd.
(hereinafter jointly referred to as "Hitachi").

The

shareholders

presented

two

62

claims

against

the

Dataproducts directors. 16 3
First, they alleged that the directors
breached their duty to oversee management. 1 64 The shareholders
claimed that, as a result of the directors' lax supervision, management manipulated the timing of the merger announcement so as to
unfairly cap the price offered to shareholders for the tender of their

Dataproducts stock. 165

Second, the shareholders charged that the

directors breached their duty of candor by misdisclosing, and failing
to disclose, material facts in the merger materials in order to induce
shareholders
price.

to tender their shares at Hitachi's $10 per share

166

In both claims, the shareholders charged the directors with acts
"that were 'not in good faith' and that constituted 'intentional
160. In re Dataproducts Shareholders' Litigation, [1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,227 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 1991).
161. Id. at 91,178.
162. Id. at 91,180.
163. Id. at 91,181.
164. Id.
165. Id. The shareholders charged the Dataproducts directors with failing to
oversee the activities of management. Id. at 91,179. The shareholders alleged
that the directors' failure of oversight allowed management to manipulate the
timing of the merger announcement so as to disadvantage the shareholders. Id.
at 91,180. Hitachi announced its $10 per share tender offer on April 16, 1990. Id.
at 91,181. Three weeks after Hitachi's announcement, Dataproducts announced
fourth quarter earnings that were better than anticipated. Id. The plaintiff
shareholders argued that management deliberately manipulated the timing of
the two announcements, making sure that the $10 per share offer was announced before the better-than-expected earnings. Id. at 91,182. The shareholders contended that announcing the tender offer first put the shareholders
at a disadvantage in obtaining the highest possible price for their shares, i.e.,
had management announced the earnings first, the announcement could have
resulted in a rise in the price of Dataproducts stock which could, in turn, have
resulted in a higher price per share tender offer. Id.
166. In re Dataproducts, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
91,182.
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misconduct.' "167 However, the defendants contended that even if
the directors were properly charged with breach of their fiduciary
duty, the shareholders' allegations were "legally insufficient because they amount at best to negligence, for which the directors are
exempted from damage liability by Dataproducts' certificate of
incorporation."

168

The Delaware Chancery Court dismissed both charges of the
plaintiff's complaint. 169 The court found that neither count of the
complaint alleged facts that even inferentially suggested that the
directors acted in bad faith. 170 Nor did the court find any contention that any of the directors realized, or even sought, any personal
benefit at the expense of the shareholders. 171 Because the plaintiffs
failed to show either bad faith or intentional misconduct, and because their claims were "equally consistent with director gross negligence," the court held that the claims were precluded by
Dataproducts' director protection clause which exculpated directors
1 72
from liability "for acts amounting to gross negligence.'
Dataproductsthus affirms the validity of section 102(b)(7) and
demonstrates that the Delaware Chancery Court will accord corporate directors broad protection under a section 102(b)(7) provision.
The burden on shareholder plaintiffs will be a heavy one: the complaint must allege facts with sufficient particularity to support a
claim of breach of one of the fiduciary duties that is not accorded
section 102(b)(7) protection. 173 Plaintiffs not meeting this burden
can expect the court to dismiss their claims as legally insufficient,
following the Dataproductsprecedent.
By contrast, the Trans-Union shareholders who won $23.5 million in damages in Van Gorkom had only to show that the directors
167. Id. at 91,183. Since the Dataproducts directors were protected by a section 102(b)(7) provision, they could only be held liable for monetary damages
for acts which the statute specifically excluded from protection. Section
102(b)(7) does not protect directors against liability for acts which are not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct. See supra notes 118-26 and
accompanying text for a discussion of acts which are not protected under a section 102(b)(7) provision.
168. The director liability provision adopted by Dataproducts as Article 15 of
its certificate of incorporation exactly tracked the language of section 102(b)(7).
In re Dataproducts, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,182-83.
169. Id. at 91,183.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court found that the effect of Dataproducts' directory liability
provision "was to exculpate the directors from liability for monetary damages
for acts amounting to gross negligence." Id. Consequently, "the directors cannot be held liable for monetary damages except for (interalia) acts amounting
to a breach of their duty of loyalty, or involving intentional misconduct, a knowing violation of law, or an improper personal benefit." Id.
173. Id.
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were grossly negligent.1 74 Now, the Dataproductscourt has established that corporations adopting a provision tracking section
102(b)(7) can expect to protect directors from liability for monetary
damages even for actions constituting gross negligence. Had such
protection been available to the Trans-Union directors sued in Van
Gorkom, they would not have been liable for monetary damages.
Thus, if the Delaware Legislature's intent in enacting section
102(b)(7)
was to prevent future Van Gorkom decisions,
Dataproducts suggests that their purpose has been accomplished.
Indeed, section 102(b)(7), as interpreted by the Dataproductscourt,
provides greater protection for corporate directors than the business judgment rule, inasmuch as it prevents acts constituting gross
negligence from resulting in personal liability for monetary damages. 175 A plaintiff who claims that directors have breached their
fiduciary duty of care will, therefore, be required to allege with particularity facts which establish that the directors acted
176
recklessly.
From a procedural point of view, a section 102(b)(7) provision
will also prove more advantageous to corporate directors than the
business judgment rule. Few plaintiffs will be able to survive a motion for dismissal based on insufficient pleadings. 177 Defendant corporate directors will, therefore, avoid discovery and trial. To avoid
dismissal, plaintiffs will be required to allege with particularity
174. The court found that the directors' actions in Van Gorkom constituted
gross negligence. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985); see also
supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. Under the Dataproductscourt's interpretation of a director liability provision adopted pursuant to section
102(b)(7), directors cannot be held liable for monetary damages for acts
amounting to gross negligence, unless their acts also constitute a breach of loyalty or involve intentional misconduct, knowing violation of law or improper
personal benefit. In re Dataproducts, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 91,183. In Van Gorkom, the court found only a violation of the duty of
care. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-873; see also text accompanying notes 95-97,
supra.
175. In Van Gorkom, the court found that the directors had been grossly
negligent and therefore were not entitled to protection under the business judgment rule. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888. As a result, the court held the directors liable for $23.5 million in damages. Id. at 893.
176. The Dataproductscourt established that a § 102(b)(7) provision exculpates directors "from liability for monetary damages for acts amounting to gross
negligence." In re Dataproducts, [1991 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 91,183. Therefore, a plaintiff who alleges that directors breached their
duty of care, as opposed to their duty of loyalty, must show that the directors'
acts amounted to more than gross negligence, i.e., a plaintiff must show that the
director's acts were reckless. Id.
177. Plaintiffs who allege a breach of the directors' duty of care will have to
allege that the directors acted recklessly. See id.; see also Paul Vizcarrondo, Jr.
& Theodore N. Mirvis, Court OK's DirectorExculpation, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 16,
1991, at 23 (describing Dataproducts as an illustration of the effectiveness of a
§ 102(b)(7) provision in "cut[ting] off litigation against directors at the pleading
stage" and observing that terminating a lawsuit before discovery benefits directors at the expense of shareholder plaintiffs).
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facts which establish recklessness in breach of the directors' duty of
care, a violation of the duty of care which constitutes intentional
178
misconduct, or a violation of the directors' duty of loyalty.
Of course, the greater the protection a section 102(b)(7) provision affords corporate directors, the greater the disadvantage it represents for shareholders who seek monetary damages from
directors for breach of their fiduciary duties. Short of actions which
constitute recklessness, section 102(b)(7) provisions render directors immune from claims for monetary damages for breach of the
duty of care. 179 Although shareholders who seek equitable remedies such as injunction will be unaffected by a section 102(b)(7) provision,1 80 the statute has all but eliminated shareholder actions for
monetary damages as a means for shareholders to exert control
over corporations.
Section 102(b)(7) was enacted as a means of encouraging qualified persons to accept positions as outside directors of Delaware corporations.18 ' As the first test of a section 102(b)(7) provision,
Dataproductshas sent a clear message to corporate directors that
the protective shield created by the Delaware Legislature will not
be rendered ineffective by the Delaware courts.
Moreover,
Dataproducts provides persuasive precedent for courts in other
states whose director liability statutes are modeled on the Delaware
82
statute.'
Given the important role outside directors play as representatives of shareholder interests, the Illinois General Assembly should
act to remove uncertainty about director liability and thereby assure that qualified persons will agree to serve as outside directors
on the boards of Illinois corporations. However, an Illinois director
liability statute should provide shareholders more protection than
they are afforded under section 102(b)(7) as interpreted in
Dataproducts. By shielding directors against liability for monetary
damages, even when their actions constitute gross negligence, the
Delaware court has defeated the purpose of encouraging outside directors to serve on corporate boards. The role of the outside direc178. Plaintiffs must allege breach of the duty of loyalty with particularity to
show that the allegation is not equally consistent with gross negligence. See In
re Dataproducts, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,183; see
also text accompanying notes 170-172 supra.
179. See In Re Dataproducts at 91,183.
180. Balotti & Gentile, supra note 104, at 16.
181. Synopsis to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7), reprinted in Pease, supra
note 4, app. at 101-02.
182. Since many states adopted director liability provisions identical to
§ 102(b)(7), the Dataproducts court's interpretation of the protection afforded
directors under § 102(b)(7) should provide persuasive precedent in those states.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text for a discussion of the director liability statutes adopted in other states.
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tor is to protect the interests of shareholders. However, this role is
rendered virtually meaningless if shareholders have no legal recourse against their representatives except for actions which constitute recklessness. As Section V will show, Illinois can reassure
directors and prospective directors that they will not be unreasonably exposed to liability, without sacrificing shareholders' rights to
damages against directors whose actions constitute gross negligence. Such a statute will protect directors from unreasonable exposure to liability without eliminating their incentive to exercise
the requisite duty of care.
V.

A DIRECTOR LIABILITY STATUTE FOR ILLINOIS

Illinois courts have traditionally applied the common law business judgment rule to protect corporate directors against personal
liability for their business decisions. 183 The Illinois First District
Appellate Court reaffirmed its adherence to the business judgment
rule as recently as March, 1992, in Stamp v. Touche Ross & Co.' 8 4 In
Stamp, the plaintiffs sought $100 million in damages against eight
former outside directors of an insolvent insurance company.'8s The
Stamp court dismissed the suit, holding that the directors were protected by the business judgment rule because the plaintiffs' complaint did not charge that the directors' acts were fraudulent,
18 6
illegal, or a result of conflict of interest.
In Stamp, the court followed Illinois precedent and held that
8 7
the business judgment rule shielded the directors from liability.1
Despite the holding in Stamp, however, a prospective director cannot be certain that Illinois courts will continue to apply the business
judgment rule in the same way in future cases. Delaware courts
183. Charles V. Murdock, Careless Directors: A New Public Policy for the
State of Illinois, ILL. B.J. 42, 48 (Sept. 1988)(reviewing Illinois Business judgment rule decisions and concluding that Illinois courts "have been exceedingly
deferential" to corporate directors).
184. Stamp v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 1-89-3214 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 13, 1992).
185. John Flynn Rooney, Business Judgment Rule Gets Boost From Court,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 17, 1992, at 1.

186. Id. See also Fields v. Sax, 462 N.E.2d 983, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (stating
that "absent evidence of bad faith, fraud, illegality, or gross overreaching, courts
are not at liberty to interfere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate directors"); Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc., 435 N.E.2d 712,
722 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (stating that a director will not be held liable for mere
errors of judgment as long as the decision does not involve "fraud, illegality, or
conflict of interest"); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968) (stating that courts should not interfere with directors' decision unless
defendants' conduct "at least borders on" fraud, illegality, or conflict of
interest).
187. Under Illinois precedent, the court will apply the business judgment
rule to shield directors' decisions when plaintiffs fail to rebut the presumption
that the directors acted in good faith. See, e.g., Fields, 462 N.E.2d at 989;
Romanik, 435 N.E.2d at 722; Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
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had traditionally applied the business judgment rule, too, until they
adopted a stricter test scrutinizing the decision-making process in
Van Gorkom.

ss

To eliminate uncertainty with respect to director liability, the
Illinois General Assembly should codify the protection currently afforded directors under the business judgment rule. The Illinois
General Assembly should enact a director liability statute modeled
on Delaware's section 102(b)(7).
However, the Illinois statute
should explicitly exclude protection for acts which constitute gross
negligence or recklessness.
Although Illinois should not follow Delaware in protecting directors against liability for acts which are grossly negligent, Illinois
should follow Delaware in adopting a statute which permits shareholders to vote to include a director liability provision in the corporation's certificate of incorporation. 18 9 Similarly, Illinois should
follow Delaware in excluding from protection acts which constitute
a breach of the director's duty of loyalty, acts of intentional misconduct, and acts which violate securities regulations. 190 Finally, like
188. See supra note 101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the change
in the standard for Delaware courts' application of the business judgment rule.
189. Illinois should enact a statute which allows shareholders to vote on
whether the corporation should include a director liability provision in its articles of incorporation because the adoption of a director liability provision constitutes a waiver of shareholders' rights to sue directors for monetary damages for
breach of the directors' duty of care. Requiring an affirmative vote of the shareholders for the adoption of a director liability provision also requires that the
board of directors inform the shareholders of the consequences of adopting a
director liability provision. See Balotti & Gentile, supra note 104, at 22 (describing the disclosures the board must make in the proxy statement sent to shareholders when the board seeks shareholder approval of a § 102(b)(7) amendment
to the corporation's charter and observing that the board must disclose the fact
that adoption of a § 102(b)(7) amendment will bar shareholder suits for monetary damages). Some commentators argue that the shareholder vote requirement is meaningless because shareholders will simply adopt a director liability
provision without reading or understanding the proposal and its consequences.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text for a discussion of these arguments.
Nonetheless, shareholders should have the opportunity to cast an informed
vote, because eliminating the requirement of a shareholder vote would guarantee that shareholders would not be informed that they are waiving certain
rights. But see supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text for a discussion of
commentators who regard voting provisions as meaningless and contend that
shareholders will not make informed decisions regarding adoption of director
liability provisions.
190. The purpose of enacting a director liability statute should be to guarantee to directors the same protection from liability for monetary damages that
the courts have traditionally accorded directors under the business judgment
rule. See Murdock, supra note 183 at 49 (stating that application of Illinois'
business judgment rule provides "adequate protection for conscientious
dirctors" but conceding that providing directors limited assurance against liability might serve a useful purpose). In Illinois, the business judgment rule does
not protect directors whose acts constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty, intentional misconduct, or violation of securities laws. See supra note 186 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Illinois courts' application of the
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Delaware, Illinois should not prevent shareholders from seeking
such equitable remedies as injunction and rescission. 191
Recognizing the important role played by directors of boards of
Illinois not-for-profit corporations, the Illinois General Assembly
has already enacted a statute which protects such directors from
personal liability for acts which are merely negligent. 192 Directors
of business corporations ought to be granted the same certainty. By
the same token, the Illinois General Assembly should act to prevent
shareholders of Illinois corporations from being placed at a disadvantage in the competition to secure the most qualified persons to
193
serve on their boards of directors.
business judgment rule to protect directors whose actions do not constitute
fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest. A director liability provision should not
expand the protection of the business judgment rule by immunizing directors
from liability for acts not protected under the business judgment rule. See Murdock, supra note 183 at 49 (describing exculpation of directors for "mere negligence" as "acceptable" and terming exculpation for gross negligence or
recklessness "legislative irresponsibility").
191. The purpose of guaranteeing directors protection against liability for
monetary damages is to encourage qualified persons to accept positions as
outside directors. See Jersild, supra note 140, at 6 (stating that the purpose of
an Illinois director liability provision is to encourage "qualified persons to serve
as directors and officers of Illinois corporations" and observing that attracting
qualified directors will enhance the "quality and stability of the governance of
Illinois corporations"). Shareholders whose corporations adopt a director liability provision are, therefore, waiving their rights to seek monetary damages
from directors in order to secure qualified outside directors who will serve as
monitors of shareholders' interests. See Pease supra note 4, at app. C 105-106
(providing Control Data Corporation Proxy Statement which discloses rights
which shareholders will waive if they adopt a director liability provison, pursuant to Delaware § 102(b)(7) and urges shareholders to adopt the provision in
order to help the company to "attract and retain good outside directors,").
However, adoption of a director liability provision does not eliminate the directors' duty of care. Pease, supra note 4, at 91 (stating that adoption of a
§ 102(b)(7) provision does not eliminate the directors' duty of care and observing that shareholders who adopt a director liability provision can still seek equitable remedies to enforce the directors' duty of care). Nor should it eliminate
equitable remedies for breach of the duty of care, since the continued availability of equitable remedies should not discourage qualified persons from accepting positions as outside directors. See, e.g., Jersild, supra note 104, at 6
(citing recent litigation in which directors were held liable for "large amounts"
in monetary damages for duty of care violations and the unavailability of director and officer liability insurance to pay such damages as the two factors which
could deter qualified persons from agreeing to serve as directors).
192. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 32, para. 108.70 (1991). The statute protects directors
and officers who serve not-for-profit corporations without compensation.
Under the statute, such persons cannot be held liable "for damages resulting
from the exercise of judgment or discretion" unless their actions constitute
willful or wanton conduct. Id.
193. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of outside directors as representatives of shareholders' interests.
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CONCLUSION
Outside directors can play an important role in protecting the
interests of shareholders. However, qualified persons may refuse to
serve as outside directors if directors are subject to liability for
monetary damages for a breach of their duty of care. Dataproducts
has shown that the Delaware director liability statute effectively
protects directors from liability for monetary damages for duty of
care violations. Dataproducts has also shown that the Delaware
statute goes too far, by protecting directors even when their acts
constitute gross negligence. Illinois can avoid this consequence by
enacting a director liability statute that explicitly excludes protection for acts which constitute gross negligence or recklessness.
Thus, shareholders who adopt the director liability protection provision envisioned in this Note will not be sacrificing a remedy which
is currently available to them. 194 Directors' acts which would not
be protected under the business judgment rule will not be protected
under a director liability statute either. 195 However, by codifying
the protection now provided under the business judgment rule, the
Illinois General Assembly will eliminate the uncertainty that may
196
cause qualified persons to decline to serve as outside directors.
Shareholders and managers of Illinois corporations should have the
most capable outside directors available. The Illinois General Assembly should, therefore, assist Illinois corporations and their
shareholders by enacting a director liability statute as set forth in
the Appendix to this Note.
Sondra J. Thorson

194. See supra note 53 and accompanying text and notes 184-186 and accompanying text for a discussion of the protection currently afforded directors
under the business judgment rule as applied by Illinois courts.
195. See supra notes 186-87 for a discussion of the limitations on protection
of directors under the Illinois business judgment rule.
196. See supra note 85 for a discussion of the uncertainty generated by Van
Gorkom which led to the director liability crisis and the refusal of qualified
persons to serve as outside directors.
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APPENDIX

The Illinois General Assembly should enact a director liability
statute, similar to Senate Bill 1214, incorporating the following
provisions:
Be it enacted by the People of the State of fllinois, represented in the
General Assembly:
Section 1. Subparagraph (b)(3) of Section 2.10 of the "Business Corporation Act of 1983," approved January 5, 1984, as amended, is amended
by renumbering it as sub-paragraph (b)(4). Section 2. Sub-paragraph
(b) of Section 2,10 of the "Business Corporation Act of 1983," approved
January 5, 1984, is amended by adding after sub-paragraph (b)(2)
thereof a new sub-paragraph (b)(3) reading as follows: (3) A provision
eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director (i) for any breach of the director's duty
of loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve gross negligence, recklessness,
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law, (iii) under section 8.65 of this title, or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall
eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omission
oc19 7
curring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective.
197. Emphasis added to indicate amendment to the Senate Bill 1214 proposed by Professor Charles W. Murdock. See Jersild Interview, supra note 143
and text accompanying note 143 for a discussion of the Task Force's draft
amendment which was introduced in the Illinois Senate as Senate Bill 1214.
Professor Murdock proposed the above amendment to the Task Force that
drafted the bill. Murdock Interview, supra note 151. Professor Murdock proposed the same amendment after the bill was introduced but the Illinois House
Judiciary Committee never amended the bill. Letter from Murdock to Representative Dunn, supra note 145 and Dunn Interview, supra note 141.

